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ABSTRACT 
Iran’s possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, along with more assertive Iranian 
foreign policies, poses new security challenges for Turkey in the Middle East. A nuclear-
weapons-capable Iran, with its important strategic position, would pose a great danger to 
peace and stability in the Middle East. An Iran with the capability of mass destruction 
would fundamentally alter the balance of power, and this situation is not acceptable for 
Turkey’s security.  
Turkey expects Iran to adopt a more moderate and cooperative approach in the 
diplomatic negotiations over its nuclear program. For this reason, Turkey has adopted a 
soft-diplomacy approach against Iran’s nuclear program. This ambiguous diplomacy 
against nuclear weapons, however, does not provide a clear definition of Turkey’s goals 
or policies with sets of political actions to deter Iran’s development of weapons of mass 
destruction. What policy should Turkey adopt against the Iran nuclear crisis? This thesis 
will attempt to answer this question in terms of shaping Turkey’s state policy against a 
nuclear Iran, evaluating the defense options of Turkey, and giving policy 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. IMPORTANCE................................................................................................1 
B. TURKEY’S THREAT PERCEPTIONS........................................................5 
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION............................................................................9 
II.  A NUCLEAR IRAN AND ITS THREATS TO TURKEY.....................................11 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................11 
B. TURKEY-IRAN RELATIONS AND ISLAMIC TRADITIONALISM...12 
C. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM................................................................18 
D. IRAN’S SUPPORT FOR PKK TERRORISM ...........................................22 
E. STRUGGLE FOR DOMINANCE IN CENTRAL ASIA...........................24 
F. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................27 
III. TURKEY’S DEFENSE OPTIONS ..........................................................................29 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................29 
B. EXTERNAL ALLIANCES...........................................................................30 
1. The United States ...............................................................................30 
2. Israel....................................................................................................36 
3. European Union .................................................................................40 
4. NATO..................................................................................................44 
C. INTERNAL COUNTERBALANCING.......................................................46 
1. A Nuclear Turkey ..............................................................................46 
2. Reinforcement of Conventional Capabilities...................................49 
D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................51 
IV. IMPACT OF A MILITARY INTERVENTION ON IRAN FOR TURKEY.......53 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................53 
B. IMPLICATIONS OF THE TWO GULF WARS .......................................54 
1. Economic Implications ......................................................................55 
2. Security Implications .........................................................................56 
C. TURKEY’S CONCERNS ABOUT U.S. RELATIONS..............................57 
D. TURKEY’S CONCERNS ABOUT ISRAELI RELATIONS ....................59 
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................61 
V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................63 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................67 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................73 
 
 viii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Map of Turkey and Iran .....................................................................................2 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank my thesis advisors Professors James Russell and Abbas 
Kadhim for their patience, knowledge, and guidance during my research. I also thank 
Professor Peter R. Lavoy, who inspired me on the subject. This thesis would not have 
been written were it not for his vision and enthusiasm. I would also like to thank Angela 
Burtz for her patience and editorial comments. 
I am indebted to my close friend Serhat Ayhan, who helped me acquire resources 
in the completion of this important step in my life and military career. Erhan Ozdemir is 
also another friend and reviewer whose help I could not have done without. 
Lastly, I would like to thank the Turkish Armed Forces for giving me the 
opportunity to pursue my postgraduate education here at the Naval Postgraduate School 
and the chance to better serve my country. 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION  
Iran’s possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, along with more assertive Iranian 
foreign policies, poses new security challenges for Turkey in the Middle East. Turkey 
expects Iran to adopt a more moderate and cooperative approach in the diplomatic 
negotiations over its nuclear program. As Turkish Prime Minister Recep T. Erdogan 
stated in a press conference, “The continuation of Iran's nuclear program for peaceful 
ends is a natural right, but it is impossible to support it if it concerns the development of 
weapons of mass destruction.”1 To this end, Turkey has adopted a soft diplomacy 
approach against Iran’s nuclear program. But this ambiguous diplomacy against nuclear 
weapons does not provide a clear definition of Turkey’s goals or a framework for policies 
with sets of political actions to deter Iran’s development of weapons of mass destruction. 
What policy should Turkey adopt against the Iran nuclear crisis? This thesis will 
attempt to answer this question in terms of shaping Turkey’s state policy against a 
nuclear Iran, evaluating the defense options of Turkey, and giving policy 
recommendations for the near-future situation in the region. 
A. IMPORTANCE 
A nuclear-weapons-capable Iran — with its important strategic position in the 
Middle East, its explicit threat against Israel, and its aggressive bid for dominance of the 
world’s richest oil region — would pose a great danger to peace and stability in the 
Middle East. An Iran with the capability of mass destruction would fundamentally alter 
the balance of power, and that would be unacceptable for Turkey’s security. 
Turkey has adopted a conventional military force for supporting and promoting 
peace and deterring instability in the fragile region of the Middle East. Because it would 
obviously lose bargaining leverage against Iran, Turkey must now, for its own security,  
play a more effective role in containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 
                                                 
1 Yigal Schleifer, “Caught in the Fray: Turkey Enters Debate on Iran's Nuclear Program,” Christian 





Figure 1.   Map of Turkey and Iran2 
Over the past decade, Iran has managed to acquire many of the parts and plants 
that are needed to make a nuclear device. Various motivating factors drive Iran towards a 
nuclear path. The first is the insecurity perception in the Middle East. Iran is surrounded 
with a neighborhood of uncertainty and unstability. After being attacked with chemical 
weapons during the Iran-Iraq war, and with the rise of new nuclear states such as India 
and Pakistan, Iran believes that it is living in a dangerous neighborhood. It lives with 
fragile, unstable, and newly emerged states such as Iraq and Afghanistan, but Iran also 
feels insecure surrounded by U.S. forces. Since the fall of the Shah and the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979, the United States and Iran have had an uneasy relationship of 
fighting, threatening, or just ignoring each other.3 Being labeled as the “Axis of Evil,” 
Iran feels that it is threatened by Israel and the United States. 
                                                 
2 Middle East Map, University of Texas Libraries, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/aj.html (accessed 25 October 2007). 
3 Michael L. Farmer, Why Iran Proliferates, M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005, 35. 
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Another motivator for Iran is political. Iran perceives its nuclear program as 
leverage in international politics. With a declared nuclear weapon or weapons program, 
Iran believes that it would increase its political bargaining power in the global political 
arena. The example of North Korea’s emergence and the fate of Saddam’s Iraq give an 
exclusive motivation to Iran. While North Korea has managed to claim a nuclear posture 
without demonstrating its capabilities, Saddam’s Iraq could not deter the United States 
from launching an attack. 
Iran’s nuclear posture is also motivated internally and individually by both “the 
nuclear myth makers” and the nuclear insecurity myth. As Charles C. Mayer proposes in 
his thesis, “Nuclear myth makers are societal elites that convince governmental leaders of 
the ‘military security and political power’ provided by nuclear weapons.”4  He also 
argues that  
Iran also uses the nuclear insecurity myth to assure the international 
community that Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons; that they are against 
the Islamic faith; that they would only make Iran more vulnerable; but that 
Iran has the right to develop all forms of civilian nuclear energy.5 
The regime also uses the nuclear quest to mitigate internal opposition and divert 
attention from economic problems related to the low prosperity of its people. In this 
manner, Tehran tries to exploit, as Kenneth M. Pollack states, the “Islamic and Persian 
pride” of its people. The Iranians see themselves as the descendants of the Persian 
Empire; many Iranians believe that their country’s history, experience, and natural 
resources mandate its role as one of the world’s great powers, and the dominant force in 
southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf.6 
                                                 
4 Peter R. Lavoy, “Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,” in The Proliferation 
Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results, ed. Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel 
(London: Frank Cass, 1993), 199, cited in Charles C. Mayer, National Security To Nationalist Myth: Why 
Iran Wants Nuclear Weapons, M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004, 4.  
5 Ibid. 
6 Kenneth M. Pollack, “The Iranian Nuclear Program: Motivations and Priorities,” (testimony 
presented at The Brookings Institution before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 17 May 2006), 
http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2006/PollackTestimony060517.pdf (accessed 25 October 2007). 
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Although Iranian officials insist that Iran’s ambitions are limited to nuclear 
energy, it is believed that the regime seeks to acquire weapons of mass destruction to use 
for political purposes and dominance in the region. A nuclear Iran’s dominance is not 
acceptable for the United States and other major, oil-dependent European countries. 
Possible restrictions of Iran on its oil distribution would endanger the vital interests of the 
United States and other oil-dependent countries.7 Because the price of oil is global, the 
increase of oil prices in the Middle East would immediately have an impact on the price 
in global oil markets.8 
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran is considered the main sponsor of 
terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and al-Qaeda.9 Especially with strong backing by Iran, 
Hezbollah is believed to have caused the Lebanon war with Israel. As A. Alfoneh argues 
in his article, “Moreover, the Iranian regime continues to embrace suicide terrorism as an 
important component of its military doctrine. . . . In order to promote suicide bombing 
and other terrorism, the regime's theoreticians have utilized religion both to recruit 
suicide bombers and to justify their actions.”10 A nuclear Iran might share weapons or 
technology leading to an atomic Hezbollah or al-Qaeda, which could have catastrophic 
results for global security and dangerous effects on the security of Turkey as a close 
neighbor to Iran. 
Lastly, a nuclear Iran would ignite a new arms race in the Middle East. As 
Michael L. Farmer argues in his thesis: “Should Iran develop nuclear weapons, there is a 
possibility that another Persian Gulf country (Saudi Arabia) would begin work on a 
‘Sunni’ bomb to equalize the ‘Shi’a’ weapon.”11 Another possibility may be Turkey’s 
                                                 
7 Karl Vick, “Iran Renews Threat to Withhold Oil: Bolton Issues Warning; Vote by U.N. Atomic 
Agency Looms,” Washington Post, 6 March 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/03/05/AR2006030500992.html (accessed 14 April 2007). 
8 Farmer, “Why Iran Proliferates,” 2. 
9 Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran's Support of the Hezbollah in Lebanon. Washington, DC: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 15 July 2006, 10, 
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060715_hezbollah.pdf (accessed 18 May 2007). 
10 Ali Alfoneh, “Iran's Suicide Brigades Terrorism Resurgent,” Middle East Quarterly 14, no.1 
(Winter 2007), http://www.meforum.org/article/1059 (accessed 11 April 2007). 
11 James Russell, "Saudi Arabia in the 21st Century: A New Security Dilemma," Middle East Policy 
12, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 67, cited in Farmer, “Why Iran Proliferates,” 2. 
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quest for nuclear capabilities to counterbalance Iran. Although Turkey disapproves of 
possessing and using nuclear weapons, Turkey may consider acquiring nuclear weapons 
capability if faced with provocative Iranian policies. But, as commonly agreed, this 
would not help to stabilize the Middle East, and it would endanger the possibility of 
peace in the region. As a result, being a close neighbor to the Middle East, Turkey must 
define its political approach to Iran, reconsider its balance of options if necessary, and be 
ready for the harsh consequences of a possible intervention against Iran, remembering the 
last two Gulf Wars and their deteriorating effects on Turkey’s security and economy. 
B. TURKEY’S THREAT PERCEPTIONS 
For almost fifty years, Turkey has been exposed to proliferation developments on 
its borders and nuclear weapons deployed on its territory. This exposure resulted from  
having borders with potential nuclear states such as Syria and Iraq, and also because of 
having lived under the protective umbrella of NATO, mainly supported by the United 
States in the Cold War era. Although not being a nuclear state and not likely to become 
one in the near future, Turkey is highly aware of the instability of the Middle East. 
Turkey has been a security-conscious state throughout its modern era. Having 
watched the recurring disputes in the Middle East, Turkey has adopted a more sensitive 
approach to threats of weapons of mass destruction. Iran and Turkey have a history of 
peace from the era of Ottoman Empire and the close economic and political relationships 
formed by the current administration.  Despite the efforts of Turkish Prime Minister 
Recep T. Erdogan with Iran, however, a nuclear or near-nuclear Iran would have a great 
chance of posing direct and indirect challenges to the security concerns of Turkey. This 
would be especially true if the Iranian regime pursued assertive and provocative 
strategies in the Middle East. 
Although the relations between Iran and Turkey have been generally peaceful 
since the Ottoman Empire, this relationship is best defined as fragile peace.12 Common 
wisdom suggests that peace between Iran and Turkey is in fact maintained by both 
                                                 
12 Yigal Schleifer, “Caught in the Fray.” 
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military and political equilibrium. Both states have traditionally seen each other as status 
quo powers. Pre-revolutionary Iran had much in common with the secular, modernizing, 
Western-oriented society Ataturk had promoted in Turkey.13 However, this relationship 
was occasionally strained by various issues after the revolution in Iran. After adopting a 
modernized and secular state policy, Turkey has always sought ways to improve ties with 
Western society, despite being a Muslim majority nation. In this manner, it was the first 
nation in the Middle East to recognize the State of Israel. Such an act was unacceptable to 
Iran. On the other hand, Iran was believed to be pursuing exploitation of Sunni-Shii 
differences and dominating the fundamentalist Islamic organizations within Turkey. 
Turkey’s main instability concerns are formed around Islamic fundamentalism, a 
possible Sunni-Shii conflict in its borders, and separatist Kurdish movements in Northern 
Iraq. Turkey's relatively stable relations with Iran slowly started to change after the 
Iranian revolution.14 Turkey’s secular elites are most concerned about the Islamic 
radicalism from Iran. This concern is mainly caused by Iranian financial support and 
other supports of Islamic movements. Such concerns, despite being marginal threats to 
Turkey’s domestic security, are seen as undesirable threats by Turkey’s secular elites. 
Another possibility for a dispute might be Iran’s backing of Kurdish separatism and 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) against Turkey.15 This issue is unlikely, however, 
because Iran also sees the Kurdish issue as a detrimental factor for its own ethnic 
structure and domestic security. Recently, both countries have cooperated in operations 
against PKK camps on their borders. 
On the other hand, Iran also has some concerns regarding Turkey, although none 
have caused a direct risk of conflict. Turkey has the potential to support separatism 
among Turkmens in Southern Azerbaijan and within Iran at a time of instability in Iran. 
But Turkey, acting deliberately in this issue, has never supported those separatist 
                                                 
13 Ian O. Lesser, “Turkey, Iran and Nuclear Risks,” in Getting Ready For A Nuclear-Ready Iran, ed. 
Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson (Cambridge, MA: The Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), 96.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 97. 
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movements, either in Iran or in Kosovo or Chechnya.16 Another concern for Iran is 
Turkey’s Western-oriented attitude and secularism against religions. Close ties with the 
West, in addition to defense and security cooperation with Israel, have troubled Iranian 
conservatives. Israel’s active participation in Turkey’s defense modernization and the 
high degree of collaboration on training and intelligence-sharing on nuclear and missile 
threats is seen as a sign of developments that might eventually lead to Turkey facilitating 
American and Israeli intervention in Iran. This facilitation could include provision of air 
bases and over-flight rights for air strikes against Iran’s nuclear structures. However, 
Turkey officially declared that it will not support a military operation that will result in 
hot conflicts adjacent to its borders.17 
In the shadow of these potential disputes between the two countries, the first and 
most explicit effect of a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran would be the direct threat of 
Iranian short- and medium-range missiles over Turkey’s soil. This threat would obviously 
lead Turkey to fast and practical counterbalancing options, such as expediting its missile 
defense program and taking a more demanding stance in its alliance options. Another 
threat is the possible assertive strategies of a nuclear Iran in regard to sources of disputes 
between Turkey and Iran. It is certain that a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran would gain 
more political bargaining power over Turkey in those issues. This new imbalance of 
power would inevitably affect the bilateral affairs regarding the Kurdish problem, energy 
issues in the Caucasian region, and other relations in the Middle East. 
The increased political leverage Iran would have over these issues would force 
Turkey to go through external and internal balancing options. Internally, Turkey might be 
driven to pursue its own nuclear quest. This would probably cause a nuclear arms race in 
the region and would inevitably pose great risks both for Turkey and other Middle East 
countries. The race between Iran and Turkey might force Russia to enter the power 
debate feeling insecure against Iran and Turkey. Along with these threats, there is another 
difficulty for Turkey in acquiring nuclear capabilities of its own: The investment in 
nuclear energy and a nuclear weapon program is highly costly. Although Turkey has 
                                                 
16 Lesser, “Turkey, Iran and Nuclear Risks,” 98. 
17 Yigal Schleifer, “Caught in the Fray.” 
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made some advances in nuclear energy, acquiring nuclear weapons is a more demanding 
task. Turkey is not seen as likely to start an independent nuclear capability since, along 
with other economic problems, it lacks the substantial civil nuclear infrastructure on 
which to build.18 Because of this, another internal balancing option may be the 
reinforcement of conventional capabilities against nuclear threat, such as improved early 
warning and missile defense capabilities. But this option also carries the possibility of 
sparking counter-security concerns from its neighbors, namely Russia, Syria, and Iraq. 
Turkey’s external balancing options are formed around the United States, Israel, 
NATO, and EU alliances. Turkey most likely will enjoy multilateral consensus for 
containing Iran in its quest. The recent debates over participating in the EU will 
inevitably coerce Ankara to act in accordance with the EU political approach by 
imposing economic sanctions against Iran. This approach mainly has the purpose of 
rolling back Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons. Economic sanctions, as George Perkovich 
and Silvia Manzanero argue, have three main aims: 
First, to impose enough pain to compel Iranian leaders to change their 
minds and abandon nuclear weapon capabilities. Second, to reduce the 
perceived benefits Iran would gain from nuclear weapons and to otherwise 
weaken Iran. Third, drawing on the former two desired effects to punish 
Iran, thus deterring future proliferators.19 
The main challenge to that coercive approach for a rollback, however, is to 
provide and maintain the international community’s cooperation and support for 
sanctions against Iran. In the absence of effective diplomatic pressure deterring Iran from 
its nuclear quest by multilateral consensus, Ankara most probably would choose 
bandwagoning with American and Israeli strikes against Iranian nuclear and missile 
facilities. It is believed that the strike option’s feasibility is very low indeed. The 
probability of success is not high, because the Iranian nuclear installations are dispersed 
and well-defended. On the other hand, the Israeli operational capabilities for this kind of 
                                                 
18 Philip Robins, “Suits and Uniforms:Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War,” (London: Hurst 
and Company, 2003), 161-81, cited in Lesser, “Turkey, Iran and Nuclear Risks,” 106.  
19 George Perkovich,Silvia Manzanero, “Iran Gets The Bomb–Then What?” in Getting Ready for a 
Nuclear-Ready Iran, eds. Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson (Cambridge, MA: The Strategic Studies 
Institute, 2005), 178. 
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sustained operation are very limited. Despite the fact that the United States is believed to 
have enough military capability to conduct such a strike effectively, it is not certain 
whether this military operation would stop the Iranian nuclear program permanently or 
delay it substantially.20 
Although Ankara is strictly against proliferation of WMD, as Turkish Foreign 
Minister Abdullah Gul restates,  
Turkey supports Iran's use of nuclear power for peaceful means. . . . 
However, the Iranian leadership must openly show its goodwill and 
convince the international community. . . . Turkey is against a military 
intervention and hot conflict within his neighborhood.21  
Other than having a neutral, cautious, and deliberate posture against Iran, Turkey has not 
exhibited its explicit intentions and explained its vital thresholds versus a nuclear Iran. 
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
A brief historical background on both countries, as well as the main political 
issues on which Turkish and Iranian foreign policy is formulated will be addressed in 
Chapter II. Evolution of the relations between the two countries will be examined, and 
near future threats of a nuclear Iran will be identified. 
The internal and external counterbalancing options of Turkey against a nuclear 
Iran will be examined in Chapter III. Effects and shortcomings of these options for future 
stability in the region will be evaluated. 
In Chapter IV, political and economic impacts on Turkey after a possible military 
strike on Iran will be analyzed in light of lessons from the two Gulf Wars that had 
deteriorating side effects on both Turkey’s economy and the bilateral relations with the 
United States of America. 
                                                 
20 Shlomo Brom, “Is the Begin Doctrine Still a Viable Option for Israel?” in Getting Ready For A 
Nuclear-Ready Iran, eds. Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, (Cambridge, MA: The Strategic Studies 
Institute, 2005), 148-9. 
21 “Turkey supports Iran’s nuclear program,” Associated Press. 
 10
Chapter V will summarize the conclusions and offer policy recommendations to 
some of the Turkish politicians who perceive a nuclear Iran as a non-threat, and to some 
security strategists who think that a nuclear Turkey is the best defense option against a 
nuclear Iran. Relying on current good economic relations and cooperation against PKK 
terrorism today does not necessarily guarantee a benign and cooperative nuclear Iran 
tomorrow. On the other hand, going nuclear after Iran is not a viable option for Turkey’s 














II.  A NUCLEAR IRAN AND ITS THREATS TO TURKEY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
It has been a cliché to say that Turkey is a bridge between the East and the West; 
however, nothing has changed from the perspective of Turkey and its politicians. The 
West has serious concerns about a Muslim majority but highly secular Turkey; the East 
disapproves of its close ties with the United States and Israel, its military and political 
alliances to promote liberalism, and its secularism and its reliance on hard power to deter 
instability in the region when necessary. With its reliance on the West’s technological 
hard power and economic support, and the East’s resources, Turkey has adopted a foreign 
policy to minimize problems and maintain good relations with its neighbors. As Oleg 
Svet highlights: 
Turkish foreign policy experts distinguish between Turkey’s friends and 
neighbors. The United States and Israel are viewed as friends because their 
relationship rests on both strategic and ideological convergence. . . . 
Theocratic, illiberal Iran and dictatorial Syria are referred to as neighbors 
rather than friends, because while they may converge on some strategic 
interests, they oppose the values on which the Turkish state was 
founded.22 
Despite the long absence of explicit military conflict with Iran, since the 
seventeenth century, Iran is referred to as “neighbor rather than friend” because Iran is 
seen to be undermining Turkish internal security by implicitly supporting Islamic 
fundamentalism and PKK terrorism. In fact, the absence of hot conflicts was maintained 
by a delicate balance of power based on mutual economic, political, and military parity 
between the two states. But, if Iran develops nuclear weapons and adopts more assertive 
policies against Turkey, that fragile balance will cease and give Iran more incentives to 
                                                 
22 Oleg Svet, Turkey’s “Zero Problem” Foreign Policy: An Untenable Balancing Act,” NIMEP 
Insights 2 (Spring 2006): 71, 
http://www.tuftsgloballeadership.org/NIMEP/insights/II/INSIGHTS06_Svet.pdf (accessed 14 October 
2007). 
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use its nuclear deterrence as political leverage in its relationship with Turkey.23 This 
chapter will identify the key issues that shape the Turkish relationship with Iran and 
assess the potential political, economic, and military threats that would emerge from 
Iran’s nuclear quest. 
B. TURKEY-IRAN RELATIONS AND ISLAMIC TRADITIONALISM 
The fragile peace between Iran and Turkey dates back to the early seventeenth 
century. Two rivals of the leadership in Islam—the Sunni (Islamic Orthodoxy) Ottoman 
Empire and the Shiite Persian Empire—struggled for dominance, especially after Shiism 
was adopted by the Safawi dynasty in 1501.24 This adoption caused Safavid Persia to 
separate its ties from the orthodox Islamic community.25 The different adaptations of 
Islam became another reason for hostility and struggle for regional hegemony between 
the Ottomans and Persia. Later, in the early seventeenth century, the two empires 
managed to reach a peaceful agreement by signing the 1639 (Kasr-I Sirin) Treaty.26 The 
1639 treaty, followed by 1847 Erzurum Treaty, established the Turkish-Iranian border, 
which remains unchanged. Although Persians occasionally tried to exploit and influence 
some religious communities of the Ottomans, such as the Alevis of Anatolia, Shiite 
expansionism was generally prevented by the Ottomans during the period.27  
Recently, the balance of power has been the main source of stable relations with 
Iran and dictates the current policies and strategies for rivalry and influence in the 
Caucasus, Central Asia and for stabilization in Northern Iraq for Turkey. But the mutual 
parity does not necessarily explain how the two Muslim majority nations walked different 
                                                 
23 Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Iran's Nuclear Program May Trigger the Young Turks to Think Nuclear." 
Proliferation News and Resources Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (December 20, 2004), 
http://www.belfercenter.org/publication/920/irans_nuclear_program_may_trigger_the_young_turks_to_thi
nk_nuclear.html?breadcrumb=%2Fexperts%2F1367%2Fmustafa_kibaroglu (accessed 13 November 2007). 
24 Tayyar Ari, Iraq, Iran, the Unites Sates and Oil (Irak ,Iran, ABD ve Petrol), 2d ed. (Istanbul: Alfa 
Press, 2007), 309. 
25 Richard H. Pfaff, “Disengagement from Traditionalism in Turkey and Iran,” The Western Political 
Quarterly 16, no. 1 (1963): 82. 
26 Dogu Silahcioglu, The United States, Israel-Iran Problem and Turkey (A.B.D., Israil-Iran Denklemi 
ve Turkiye) (Istanbul: Gunizi Press, 2006), 24. 
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paths towards the twenty-first century as a secular, democratic Turkey and an Islamic 
Republic of Iran under the same initial Islamic rule of the Shari’a. Turkey claims that Iran 
seeks to influence religious groups and motivate them against Turkey’s domestic order. 
On the other hand, Iran sees Turkey’s close strategic ties with Israel and the West as a 
detrimental threat to its security and to other Arab nations in the region. Therefore, it is 
important to review and mark the main historical and religious factors to better reveal and 
understand how the security concerns of the two states were formed. 
Islamic traditionalism had the same effect on both communities. The social life of 
a Muslim was not so different in the Sunni Ottoman Empire and Shiite Iran. Although the 
adaptation of Shari’a (the law of Allah) in Sunni Ottoman and Shiite Iran was slightly 
different according to its sources of law, jurisdiction of Shari’a — which regulates 
political, economic, and social life — had almost the same effects on both Muslim 
communities. Interpretation of Islam by its followers had the same preventive effect on 
society for evolutionary movements. Any kind of evolutionary ideas were seen as 
detrimental threats to the established order. This characteristic of Islamic traditionalism 
has become the main obstacle for a society to change. Islamic traditionalism delayed any 
Western ideas from affecting the political and social order, especially in Iran. 
The Shari’a law, in principle, binds all Muslims without taking nationality into 
account and is considered to be higher than any state organizations. However, as Richard 
H. Pfaff states in his article, “The Ottoman Sultans and the Qajar Shahs found it 
increasingly necessary to ‘supplement’ Shari'a law by royal decrees having the effect of 
laws.”28 Both Ottomans’ and Iran’s citizens included a non-Muslim population, and the 
harsh Shari’a rules with its lack of regulations on commercial life did not suffice to 
manage the non-Muslim minorities.  
Ottoman Sultans benefited from national customs that reached back to earlier 
Turkic culture before the adoption of Islam to protect their military and administrative 
system from religious effects. Dependence on and maintenance of national customs (adet, 
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orf) has helped Turkish nationalists, called the Young Turks, to adapt the ideas of 
“liberty” and “nation” from the West, especially from France in the late eighteenth 
century.29 The Ottoman nationalism that binds all Muslims and non-Muslims of the 
community was an obstacle before a successful and meaningful definition of this new 
nationalism. However, the defeat and territorial losses of the Ottoman Empire in World 
War I left Ottoman Turks with a relatively homogenous population in Anatolia and thus 
cleared this main obstacle. Later, the path for divergence from Ottoman nationalism 
paved the way for a successful nation-state Turkey under the leadership of Mustafa K. 
Ataturk. But it is important to highlight the difference in defining Ataturk’s nationalism 
from the Young Turks’ or other ethnic-based definitions of nationalism. Ataturk’s 
Turkish nationalism does not require ethnically being a Turk; but it implies the desire to 
live peacefully and together with the Turkish nation, which is connected with the same 
culture and history as that of Turkish citizens. In this manner, citizenship of Turkey is 
defined objectively on historical and cultural ties rather than on subjective ethnic 
identities. 
The path for Iran towards the twentieth century was slightly different. Iranians, 
like Ottoman Turks, enjoyed a historic Persian identity that preceded the Muslim binding 
effect of Islam. Similar to Ottomans, in Iran the Shari’a law was supplemented by  
A body of positive law based on the ruler’s prerogative to initiate rules for 
the good of the community. This prerogative, known as ‘urf,’ was resorted 
to continually in both countries…. Certain decisions concerning matters of 
state (e.g., rebellion, rioting, and murder) were almost always adjudicated 
by decisions based on ‘urf’… — Richard H. Pfaff.30  
But, in contrast to the Ottomans, Iran was not strongly challenged by the spread of 
nationalism from the West because of its geographical distance. The Western impact 
came from Russian and British imperialism; however, they both cancelled each other and 
faced strong opposition from the Shiite ‘ulema. The Shiite order that lived a strong era 
throughout the Qajar dynasty had a strengthening effect on Iran’s Islamic traditionalism 
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against nationalism coming from the West. Poor geographical conditions and a lack of 
communication facilities helped Islamic traditionalism to oppress the spread of 
nationalism.31 
The reform movement to establish a constitution in Iran in 1906–1907 was 
therefore different in comparison to the Ottoman constitution of 1876, which was 
reinstated by the Young Turks in 1907. In contrast to the Young Turks’ reform quest, 
Iran’s reform attempt was to limit and to control the power of Shah. The reform was in 
fact a consolidation of Islamic traditionalism and was supported by religious order in 
Iran.32 
During 1921–1941, Reza Shah’s reforms were very similar to those of Ataturk’s 
in Turkey; however, Shah’s serious steps to create a strong central government and to 
extend his control over the country were limited since Shah did not enjoy the well-trained 
army and the support of Western-oriented and secular nationalists that Ataturk had.33 
Being a Shah was still Islam by definition, and in fact a strong indication of the same 
influential Islamic traditionalism that was in control of Shiite ‘ulema. Thus, Shah’s bid 
for promotion of Western values in Iran never reached the same level as the revolutionary 
and secular character of Ataturk’s ideas. 
After World War I, both Turkey and Iran focused on stabilizing their domestic 
orders and preserving good relations with each other. The new republic in Turkey in 1923 
rejected its Islamic traditionalism and abandoned both its pan-Islamic and pan-Turkish 
ambitions. Turkey aimed to live in peace with its neighbors and concentrated on 
economic prosperity for modernization. Similarly, Reza Shah changed the country’s 
name from Persia to Iran and maintained good external relations to deal with internal 
struggle; acquiring central control became his primary objective.34 
                                                 
31 Pfaff, “Disengagement from Traditionalism in Turkey and Iran,” 81-2. 
32 Ibid. 
33 John Calabrese, “Turkey and Iran: Limits of a Stable Relationship,” British Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies 25, no. 1 (1998): 76 and Pfaff, “Disengagement from Traditionalism in Turkey and Iran,” 
87. 
34 Unal Gundogan, “Islamist Iran and Turkey, 1979-1989: State Pragmatism and Ideological 
Influences,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 7, no. 1 (2003): 1-2. 
 16
The Cold War era and Soviet expansionism caused Turkey and Iran to form a 
more cooperative relationship. Both countries feared Soviet incursion and its expansionist 
external policies. Thus, they adopted cooperative strategies and strengthened their ties 
with the West, especially with the United States. The common threat perception led the 
two countries to become regional allies with the Baghdad Pact (Central Treaty 
Organization) in 1955 and the Regional Cooperation Development (RCD) organization in 
1968.35 Turkey improved its military power with NATO membership, and that 
improvement was well beyond that of Iran. Later, Iran benefited from the 1970’s oil crisis 
and got ambitious about becoming a regional power by acquiring massive amount of 
weapons. Neither, however, perceived the other’s military buildups as a threat. Turkey’s 
focus was on Greece, while Iran concentrated on Egypt and Iraq.36 
The 1979 Iran revolution was a turning point for relations with Turkey. Although 
the Turkish government under Bulent Ecevit’s administration was not late to recognize 
the new regime in Iran, suspicion against Iran’s revolution gradually became the main 
factor to shape the bilateral cooperation.37 Iran’s role in promoting its revolutionary 
movements throughout the Islamic societies, and its bid for influencing religious groups 
and supporting anti-democratic activities in Turkey, formed a significant domestic 
security concern for the Turkish secular elite.38 Although both sides felt the necessity to 
be on same track on economic cooperation, Turkey’s politicians and strategists saw Iran 
as the enemy of its Western-oriented secular democracy and political order, and this was 
a major barrier for stable and good political relations. 
Post-revolutionary Iran was not the same Iran that Turkey recognized and 
adjusted to in the height of Cold War threats. Once again, Islamic traditionalism was in 
formidable practice in Iran with Ayatollah R. Khomeini. The Khomeini regime showed 
its explicit intention to promote the values of post-revolutionary Iran and this promotion 
extended beyond Iran’s borders. This was a highly hazardous situation for the martial law 
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that was established by the Turkish Armed Forces in 1980. The martial law came after a 
political turmoil and violent domestic struggle in Turkey, and its primary aim was to 
consolidate domestic security and reestablish the secure environment for a democratic 
order.39 
PKK terrorism that hit Turkey after 1983 became another trust issue between 
Ankara and Tehran. Ankara blamed Tehran for allowing PKK terrorists to use Iranian 
territory as a base for their attacks on Turkey. Iran, on the other hand, accused Turkey of 
supporting anti-revolutionary forces, such as the Mujaheddin-e Khalq (MKO) within 
Iran.40 Turkey’s disturbance about Iranian support for the PKK or Iran’s inability to 
control its borders for terrorist activities brought Ankara and Tehran to the brink of hot 
conflict. 
The competition for dominance between Turkey and Iran in Central Asia and 
south Caucasus became another potential dispute. The sudden demise of the Soviet Union 
opened a window of opportunities for the two countries and they expanded their cultural 
and economic relations with those newly emerged states. Energy resources in the Caspian 
Basin and the transfer of those resources from Asia to the West formed an important 
issue and a possibility for a military clash between Turkey and Iran. 
An outline of Turkish-Iranian relations reveals that cultural and political nuances 
were an important factor. Although, from time to time, they managed to cooperate for 
their mutual interests, their struggle to become a leading power in the region always 
existed. Turkish claims about Islamic fundamentalism being supported by Iran, and 
Turkey’s discontent about PKK, influence competition in Central Asia and Caucasus, 
forming a great possibility for a hot conflict if Iranian officials consider weapons of mass 
destruction as a credible deterrent against Turkey. Examining those issues will help 
determine the scope of threats that would rise from a nuclear Iran. 
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C. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 
It is generally believed that Iran's revolution has encouraged many Islamic groups 
to utilize political Islam as an effective way to bring a new political and social order to 
Muslim communities. Furthermore, Iran is blamed for influencing and aiding Muslim 
revolutionary movements externally throughout militant Islamic groups in Muslim 
majority countries. Although Iran’s role in revolutionary Islam is mostly exacerbated by 
“West and Arab regimes,” Ankara became increasingly concerned about Iranian-led 
Islamic fundamentalism and saw Iran’s active involvement in social Islamic debates in 
Turkey as an important threat to its internal security.41 On 24 August 1986, Khomeini’s 
verbal attacks on Turkey’s respectful leader M. Kemal Ataturk were received as an 
indicator of the Iranian regime’s provocation to destroy Turkey’s constitutional order: 
In the Islamic world, the ulama were led to believe that they had to obey 
the tyrants, oppressors, and the holders of naked power. Certain lackeys 
preferred to obey Ataturk, who destroyed the rule of Islam, instead of 
obeying the orders of the prophet. How can a reasonable mind accept this? 
Today, the ulama [in Turkey] who are the puppets of the Pharaonic forces, 
teach the people the orders of God and the prophet, but at the same time 
call on them to obey Ataturk.... How can one argue that this is consistent 
with the notion of [Islamic rulers] whom God ordered us to obey? 
Obviously, [Islamic rulers] in the real sense can only be those who follow 
the order of God and his messenger...42 
Khomeini targeted Turkish revolution, which managed to separate Islam from the 
state and abolished the caliphate with establishing a Presidency of Religious Affairs (T.C. 
Basbakanlik Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi) to unify Islamic muftis.43 The revolution in 
Turkey was challenged repeatedly by independent Islamic fundamentalists who could not 
digest the modern and independent Turkey after the Ottoman Empire. This was another 
provocative sign of support from Iran, according to the Turkish secular elite. On top of 
that, as U. Gundogan highlights: 
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In November 1988, the Iranian Embassy in Ankara refused to follow all 
other foreign missions by lowering its flag to half-mast to commemorate 
the 50th anniversary of Ataturk’s death. This was severely criticized by 
the Turkish press and described as “unforgivable insolence.”44 
Those expressions and unfriendly acts by Iranian officials were intensely felt in 
the Turkish press. The Turkish press was not late to condemn and retaliate, focusing on 
the Shi’i nature of the Iranian revolution and indicating its propaganda activities as a 
quest try to establish a Shari’a order in Turkey.45 
Turkish leaders were not interested in a “press war” between Iran and Turkey; 
however, when the Iranian regime entered the debate about the Turkish Constitutional 
Court’s legal decision and ban—according to the Turkish Constitution—on wearing a 
headscarf (turban) in official places such as university campuses, this was understood as a 
major threat from Iran in supporting the Islamist movement in Turkey.46 Protests and 
demonstrations were held in Turkey and many secular Turks were suspicious about 
Iranian support. Encouraged by Iranian officials, students also held supporting marches in 
Iran.47 Khomeini’s main agenda to safeguard the rights of Muslims everywhere was 
understood to interfere with internal problems of Turkey, and this was unacceptable for a 
sovereign state. Iran, moreover, threatened to cut economic trade with Turkey from $2 
billion to $400 million in 1989 via Iran’s Turkey ambassador.48 Turkey’s response was to 
expel Iran’s ambassador from Turkey.49 
Throughout the 1990s, Turkey faced a “twin threat” rising from political Islam 
and ethnic Kurdish nationalism, and this threat perception somewhat increased the 
influence of Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) in order to protect the continuation of a 
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democratic and secular regime.50 Despite the fact that those influences were highly 
criticized by the West from the civil-military relationship perspective, this kind of duty 
was and is still within the unique constitutional duties of Turkish Armed Forces. When 
Islamist Erbakan became prime minister in a coalition with Tansu Ciller, the leader of the 
center-right True Path Party, his pro-Iranian policies and religious-oriented attitude made 
the secular elite, namely the military, worried. As O. Oktay states in her article: 
The Islamist Prime Minister Erbakan’s pro-Iranian policies led to the split 
between the politicians and the military… he made his first foreign trip to 
Tehran and denied the allegations that Iran and Syria were sponsoring 
terrorism carried out by the separatist PKK, in spite of intelligence reports 
stating otherwise, given to him by the Turkish National Intelligence 
Agency (MIT).51  
The Sincan incident also caused a turbulent atmosphere and finally became the 
end of Erbakan’s administration.52 The mayor of Sincan town, Bekir Yildiz from the 
Welfare’s Party, held “A night for Jerusalem” in the last weekend of January 1997. Iran’s 
ambassador Muhammed Riza Bagheri along with Mahmud Bin Yasin were among the 
guests, and Bagheri made a speech under the posters of Hezbollah and Hamas leaders. He 
criticized the United Kingdom and the United States over their “illegal” support of the 
“illegal state of Israel,” and further condemned Turkish policies about Israel: “Those who 
signed agreements with the United States and Israel would, sooner or later, be penalized 
by Turkish youths.”53 
Bagheri became the second Iranian ambassador to be expelled from Turkey, and 
Bekir Yildiz, along with eleven other diplomats, was sentenced to imprisonment. In 
retaliation, Iran expelled Turkish ambassador Osman Koruturk and Turkish consul Ufuk 
Ozsancak.54 Afterwards, the Kavakci headscarf incident caused more political turmoil in 
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relations with Iran.55 Throughout the 2000s, relations with Iran further deteriorated with 
Turkish claims about the evidence of Iranian financial support of Islamic fundamentalist 
groups and training of Hezbollah terrorists, and Iran’s involvement in political 
assassinations within Turkey.56 Tehran, in the same manner, accused Turkey of harboring 
an armed Iranian opposition group, the Mujahadin Khalq. Turkey saw Iranian Islamist 
fundamentalism and the spread of its revolution as a domestic threat to its security. 
Similarly, Iran perceived Turkey, with its large, conventional modern army and its 
secular and anti-traditional democratic order as a neighbor that was harmful and hostile to 
its existence. 
Iran’s success in spreading revolutionary Islam often faced the negative effects of 
competing with safeguarding Iran’s own national security and especially its economic 
interests. Its revolutionary ideologies were deeply affected by contemporary practical 
affairs and external political and economic situations in the international arena. This 
caused inconsistency in Iran’s international behavior and restricted the success of 
revolutionary influence on other Muslim communities.57 However, a nuclear-weapons-
capable Iran might feel confident about its own national security and focus its undivided 
attention on importing its Islamic revolution. As Duygu Sezer, a Turkish scholar 
highlights: 
A nuclear-armed Iran would be in a position to claim leadership of the 
Islamic world, and to exercise increased influence on Turkish domestic 
politics to the detriment of Turkey’s Western-type secular democratic 
regime and western-oriented foreign policy.58 
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Reliance on nuclear weapons might propel Iranian leaders to pursue the “neither 
East nor West, only Islam” slogan more easily and this would have a booster effect on 
radical Islamists in Turkey, which would have deteriorating side effects on Turkey’s 
secular order and domestic security. 
D. IRAN’S SUPPORT FOR PKK TERRORISM 
In addition to Islamic fundamentalism, Turkey faced PKK terrorism, allegedly 
supported by Iran, from the early 1990s through the late 2000s. Turkey accused Iran of 
supporting PKK by supplying weapons, training, and funds in the 1990s. Later, Turkey 
mostly accused Iran of turning a blind eye on PKK settlements in its borders and 
permitting PKK to stage attacks on Turkish troops.59 Contrary to Turkey’s claims, Iran 
denied the accusations and stated that PKK was an extension of Turkey’s internal ethnic 
nationalism problem rising from Turkey’s oppressive policies towards the Kurds.60 
Iran, like Turkey, feared the emergence of an independent Kurdish state in 
Northern Iraq; however, another source of fear was the exclusive Turkish influence in 
Northern Iraq due to hot pursuits of PKK terrorists on Iraqi soil, with permission from 
Baghdad. Iran once thought that Turkey was trying to reach and control the oil-fields of 
Mosul and Kerkuk, and was strictly against Turkish military operations’ extension to 
Southern regions.  From Turkey’s perspective, Iran was using PKK as leverage to 
increase its influence in Northern Iraq. Especially after the capture of Ocalan (former 
leader of PKK), Iran allowed PKK to hold its Annual Congress in Urmiya in February 
1999. As R. Olson highlights, according to Turkey’s claims: 
Iran intelligence co-operated with the PKK in recruiting local Kurds to 
carry out terrorist attacks against targets within Turkey. Ocalan's 
admission from prison, whether compelled or not, that Iran supplied the 
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and Russia, and that Tehran pressed Jalal Talabani to allow his territory to 
be used by the PKK to stage raids into northern Iraq increased Turkey’s 
ire.61 
Continuous PKK attacks on Turkish soil, and Turkish military operations that 
extended beyond its borders in pursuit of remnant PKK guerillas, became a tense issue 
for Iran. In 1999, Iran claimed that Turkish fighter planes bombed and damaged some 
Iranian village houses.62 Iran's allegations that Turkish fighter aircraft bombed Iranian 
territory, and five Iranian soldiers were killed, caused political friction between the two 
countries. Iran, in retaliation, captured two Turkish soldiers, claiming that they were 
operating inside the Iran border and that they “invaded Iran.” In addition, Iran threatened 
to hold the two Turkish soldiers until Turkey paid compensation. Turkey rejected these 
claims and Prime Minister Ecevit responded that, “If we had intended to invade Iran, we 
would not have done so with two soldiers.”63 On top of that, Chief of the Turkish General 
Staff Huseyin Kivrikoglu stated that,  
Turkey has not bombed territory in Iran; rather it was in Iraq; further, it is 
impossible for Turkish pilots to miss or mistake a target because all targets 
and their coordinates are programmed with accurate maps into a computer. 
It is impossible to make a mistake.64  
Both countries sent military delegations to the bombed territory, and later Turkey 
admitted the inadvertent drops of a few bombs on Iranian soil. Likewise, Iran was willing 
to accept that the bombing was a mistake and returned the two Turkish soldiers to 
Turkey. The crisis ended in peace; however, it showed how the two countries came to the 
brink of war over the issue of PKK. 
Although both Turkey and Iran are concerned about potential Iraqi territorial 
disintegration that would result with a Kurdish state in the North, the PKK-related crisis 
shows that the two countries are in fact very close to hot conflicts. If any side escalates 
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the disputes, there is a possibility that they will be dragged into a military clash. In the 
face of a nuclear Iran, Ankara may feel restricted from confronting Tehran in crises like 
this. In any escalated scenario, Tehran might view nuclear weapons as leverage or 
compensation for its conventional disabilities. If Turkey coerces Tehran with limited use 
of force or harsh sanctions, as it did in 1995 and 1999, Iran might feel the need to use its 
WMD capabilities to preempt or prevent a Turkish incursion into Northern Iraq or might 
threaten Ankara covertly or exclusively to strike strategic targets within Turkey. A 
nuclear Iran would also have the capability to restrict and thus to manipulate Turkey’s 
policies and alliance options in Northern Iraq and in the Middle East. 
E. STRUGGLE FOR DOMINANCE IN CENTRAL ASIA 
The sudden demise of the Soviet Union opened a window of opportunities for 
Turkey and Iran and they expanded their cultural and economic relations with those 
newly emerged states. Energy resources in the Caspian Basin and the transfer of those 
resources from Asia to the West formed an important issue and a possibility for a military 
clash between Turkey and Iran. 
Turkey tried to utilize its common history, cultural values, and language with 
those populations. Being in an eastern periphery of Europe, and having the support of the 
United States against Soviet expansionism, and Iran’s religious hegemony in Central Asia 
gave Turkey a chance to establish close ties with Azerbaijan and other Turkic states. 
Iran’s direct access to the Persian Gulf and its religious commonalities were the main 
factors that drove Iran’s attention to Central Asia.65 But their scope of influence was 
challenged by the stress on their economies resulting from their support of those newly 
emerged states with the necessary economic aids. Trying to impose any kind of strict 
economic and cultural model on these countries was another counterproductive method 
for gaining influence, since those states barely survived Soviet pressure. And as 
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Calabrese argues, “… they have failed to persuade observers, many of whom have 
depicted Turkish and Iranian activity in the NIS as fiercely and directly competitive.”66 
Azerbaijan was one of the most important states where Turkish and Iranian 
interests competed for influence, mostly because of Azerbaijan’s resources and strategic 
location. Azerbaijan is a bridge to Central Asia for Turkey, and Turkey gained 
Azerbaijan’s thrust and confidence with its president Elchibey. Elchibey was against 
Iran’s coercive and irredentist policies and exerted Azerbaijan nationalism in the 
country.67 This tendency made Turkey a close ally. In addition to having cultural and 
ethnic similarities with Azerbaijan, Turkey was also interested in Azerbaijan’s natural 
resources and the transfer of those resources; thus Turkey became an important ally in the 
field of oil production and pipeline construction in Azerbaijan. However, Azerbaijan also 
shared a border with Iran and possessed common cultural attributes with Iran's Azeri 
population. As Calabrese highlights, “… geographic and ethnographic facts have 
accentuated the importance of Azerbaijan to Iran. Preventing, if possible, the domination 
of Azerbaijan by any foreign or regional power—especially a hostile one—is vitally 
important to Iran.”68 “The domination of Azerbaijan by any foreign or regional power” 
was a reference to Turkey’s support of President Elchibey. 
The Nagorno-Karabakh crisis became the first signal of Turkey-Iran rivalry in the 
Central Asia. The alliance between Azerbaijan and Turkey depended on the supplying of 
military hardware and training because of strong economic and cultural ties, and required 
Turkey to support Azerbaijan in the crisis.69 In this regard, Iran wanted to support 
Armenia; however, “…the costs of a protracted conflict—including the burdens of 
humanitarian and refugee assistance, along with the risk of increasing friction with 
Turkey—chastened Iran.”70 But the real factor that limited the freedom of Turkey-Iran 
actions in the conflict was Russia.  “The reassertion of Russian interests in Azerbaijan, 
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and in the Caucasus generally, has fuelled Turkish-Russian competition. By comparison, 
Turkish-Iranian rivalry is both less intense and less consequential.”71 
The competition between Turkey and Iran brought them to the edge of a military 
clash over the Caspian Sea demarcation problem in August 2001. The bilateral 
agreements Russia had with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in 2001 inclined Iran to take a 
more serious stance on the issue by sending its gunboats to intercept an Azerbaijan vessel 
that was scanning a disputed area of the Caspian Sea and also violating Azerbaijan 
airspace for intimidation.72 
After the warning fires of Iranian boats, Turkey launched necessary military 
actions to stop Iran from asserting its power over Azerbaijan in the demarcation of the 
Caspian Sea. In this regard, chief of the General Staff General Huseyin Kivrikoglu's 
official visit, which was accompanied by F-16 fighters to Azerbaijan on August 23–25, 
was perceived as an intimidation from Turkey to Iran. An official from the Iranian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated the following: 
We do not view Turkey as a frightening power. However, this adventurous 
gesture will be given retaliation. The mutual relations will be seriously 
affected by this initiative. These planes show Turkey's support for 
Azerbaijan, which disagrees with Iran concerning the Caspian oil, and this 
situation causes tension in the region.73 
The Caspian Sea crisis shows that Iran’s and Turkey’s policies of rivalry might 
lead the two countries into a military clash in Central Asia. Both Turkey and Iran pay 
significant attention not to violate mutual political boundaries while pursuing influential 
strategies in the region. In this regard, Turkey’s undisputed conventional preponderance  
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plays an important role in preventing escalations with Iran. During a tense crisis or in any 
escalation, however, both might lose their rationale and drift into a situation that would 
eventually include fire exchanges. 
A nuclear Iran, relying on its WMD and advanced missiles capabilities, might 
pursue an aggressive stance in its policies toward its neighbors in Central Asia or in the 
Caucasus. Seeing itself a nuclear power, Iran might feel more confident and exercise 
more assertive policies against Turkey. It is certain that a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran 
would gain more political bargaining power over Turkey on energy and economic issues 
of Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The bitter tone of relations completely changed in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraqi 
war. Iran enhanced its ties with Turkey, because both Iran and Turkey are concerned 
about potential Iraqi territorial disintegration that would result with a Kurdish state in the 
North. However, this enhancement of relations came after isolation of Iran by U.S. forces 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. The press is no longer discussing the Iranian invisible 
revolutionary hand in Turkey’s internal Islam-related debates. The two countries’ 
influential policies left their places to bilateral economic agreements and close ties. 
Turkey is nowadays enjoying great support and cooperation over the PKK issue, and Iran 
seems to realize how the separatist Kurdish problem would be a detrimental factor for its 
own ethnic structure and domestic security. 
For the Turkish secular elite, the dangers of assertive Iran policies are not 
forgotten. The history of relations between Iran and Turkey, which reach back to the 
Ottomans and Persians, as examined in this chapter, reveals and identifies the mutual 
power parity for sustained peaceful relations. The fear of losses was among the important 
factors for the Ottoman Empire in preferring its expansionism towards the West rather 
than Persia. Likewise, Iran chose to enhance its good relations with Turkey, only after it 
found itself in the corner in the Cold War. The first enhancement period came 
immediately after the Iran-Iraqi war. The neutrality of Turkey was important for Iran 
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because, “Turkey was among the small number of countries (together with Pakistan) 
whose roads and ports Iran could use for the delivery of strategic goods and arms.”74 
Most Turkish strategists believe recent relations are a reflection of Iran’s attempt to break 
its isolation that rises from the United States military deployment, Israel’s nuclear stance, 
and the European Union’s pressure against Iran’s nuclear quest. In this regard, a friendly 
Iran might be an illusion for Turkey when Iran possesses nuclear weapons. 
Although not targeted at Turkey, Iran’s medium-range missile capability is 
already a dangerous threat to Turkish defense. In this regard, Turkey does not share 
Israel’s threat perception of Iran. However, if Iran combined its missile payloads with 
nuclear warheads, the consequences would be very harsh for Turkey. Iran would most 
probably feel inclined to use deterrence of WMD in hardening its stance in the region and 
would exert more assertive policies especially in its relations with Turkey. 
Turkey, feeling insecure, might start to pursue its own nuclear weapons program 
and this also might lead to an ignition of a new arms race in the Middle East. Saudi 
Arabia would begin producing a “Sunni bomb” to equalize the “Shi’a weapon.”75 As 
commonly agreed, these types of counterbalancing of a nuclear Iran would not help to 
stabilize the Middle East and would endanger the possibility of peace in the region. As a 
result, being a close neighbor to the Middle East, Turkey must define its political 
approach to Iran, reconsider its balance of options if necessary, and be ready for the harsh 
consequences of a possible intervention against Iran, remembering the last two Gulf Wars 
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III. TURKEY’S DEFENSE OPTIONS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Iran’s ambition “to exercise its right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful 
means” or in other words it’s allegedly “clandestine quest for nuclear weapons” 
highlights a complicated security issue in the Middle East. A nuclear Iran with its hatred 
against so-called Zionism is an unacceptable threat to Israel’s existence in the region. The 
United States, as an ally and close supporter of Israel, shares the same perception and 
poses a determined stance for an immediate solution. The European Union is more 
cautious and prefers diplomacy first; however, diplomacy and its most coercive method 
of sanctions for a rollback also yield its limitations, since the European nations have 
considerable trade with Iran.76 Likewise, Russia and China’s attitudes rely heavily on 
Iran’s role as an oil producer.77  
Turkey, a close neighbor to Iran, also finds a nuclear Iran unacceptable both for 
its own existence and for a stable Middle East, as discussed in the previous chapter; 
however, Turkey has not shown its official stance against Iran’s nuclear quest.78 Turkey’s 
position on dealing with a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran still maintains its ambiguity. 
Regarding the long peace period from 1639 and recently enhanced economic and political 
relationships formed by the current administration of Turkish Prime Minister Recep T. 
Erdogan with Iran, Turkey’s deliberate and ambiguous policies projecting a neutral 
posture might seem appropriate, but that neutrality has nothing to do with dissuading Iran 
from becoming another nuclear power in the region. 
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The first section of this chapter will identify the external alliance options that 
Turkey should adopt on diverting Iran from its nuclear quest. The next section will be 
devoted to analyzing the internal counterbalancing options to deter Iran from utilizing its 
WMD capability to exert assertive policies against Turkey — if Iran reaches a nuclear-
weapons-capable status. Reflections and shortcomings of these options for future Turkish 
foreign policy for durable stability in the region will be evaluated. 
B. EXTERNAL ALLIANCES 
Turkey has been exposed to proliferation developments on its borders and nuclear 
weapons deployed on its territory, both because of having borders with potential nuclear 
states such as Syria and Iraq and because of having lived under the protective umbrella of 
NATO, mainly supported by the United States in the Cold War era. Close ties with the 
United States, reliance on American defense systems, and Israel’s active participation in 
Turkey’s defense modernization and high degree of collaboration on training and 
intelligence sharing on nuclear and missile threats are seen as signs of developments that 
might eventually lead to Turkey’s facilitating American and Israeli intervention in Iran. 
This facilitation could include provision of air bases and over-flight rights for air strikes 
against Iran’s nuclear structures. On the other hand, Turkey officially declared that it will 
not support a military operation that will result in hot conflicts adjacent to its borders.79 
For this reason, Turkey’s external balancing options are formed not only around the 
United States and Israel but also the NATO and EU alliances. Implications of the U.S. 
strategy, Israel’s choices, and the European Union’s diplomacy and economic sanctions 
approach along with NATO’s security commitments on the issue will have important 
effects on shaping Turkey’s stance against Iran’s nuclear program. 
1. The United States 
Iran’s clandestine nuclear program faced strong opposition from the United States 
when it was discovered that Iran had made good progress on the road to nuclear weapons 
with the uranium enrichment facility in Natanz and the heavy water production facility in 
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Arak in August 2002 despite the U.S. dual containment policies.80 According to the 
United States, Iran’s cowardly attempt to build uranium enrichment facilities in Natanz 
was for the exclusive intention of developing nuclear weapons.81 The United States 
strongly argued that Iran’s secret intentions on uranium enrichment are a violation of 
Article II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and for this reason Iran also should not 
be entitled to implement its rights under Article IV in order to develop nuclear 
technology.82 
The United States is seen as being on the most determined side to stop Iran from 
developing nuclear weapons and repeatedly highlights the need for a decisive action on 
the issue. As Vice President Dick Cheney stated,  
The Iranian regime needs to know that if it stays on its present course, the 
international community is prepared to impose meaningful consequences. 
For our part, the United States is keeping all options on the table in 
addressing the irresponsible conduct of the regime.... We will not allow 
Iran to have a nuclear weapon.83 
Although the United States together with Israel have been the supporters of 
immediate and decisive action to prevent Iran becoming nuclear state, according to a 
Turkish Scholar, Mustafa Kibaroglu: 
The United States faces essentially three options to stop Iran from going 
further down the road to become a de facto nuclear weapons state. The 
first possibility is to stage “regime change” and bring in an administration 
that might renounce nuclear weapons. The second is to carry out a 
“military strike” (limited in scope and purpose) against carefully selected 
nuclear installations to set the nuclear program back several years. The 
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third is to “engage” Iran diplomatically and apply a “carrot and stick” 
policy to convince the mullahs that it is not in their best interest to pursue 
a complete nuclear fuel cycle…84 
It is a certain fact that young generations in Iran are displeased with the current 
regime and do not want Iran to be mentioned in connection with phrases like 
“sponsorship of terror” and “pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.”  In this regard, as 
Michael Rubin from Pentagon states, “We are calling for regime change, but we trust the 
Iranian people to do it for themselves. The Islamic Republic is incapable of reforming 
itself, and the United States will stand with the people.”85 But counting on a democratic 
movement supplied by a “popular uprising” or in other words “civil war” has a low 
probability because as Kaveh Ehsani argues, “hardliners in the Iranian regime have 
managed effectively to block most significant attempts at reforming governance over the 
past four years.”86 Tehran managed to suppress Iranian students’ demonstrations to 
protest the current regime in 1999, and such movements are unlikely to be repeated in the 
near future. Another indication that a civil uprising would fail is that, according to M. 
Kibaroglu: 
When it comes to the nuclear weapons issue, those in the opposition are 
similar to the regime supporters. They also want the bomb, but not in the 
hands of the mullahs. Therefore, the theory of “regime change” even with 
a slim chance of success in the foreseeable future, apparently will not 
work in Iran as far as denouncing nuclear weapons capability is 
concerned.87 
There is also a considerable group in Iran that does not believe in the external 
preaching on democracy and see this effort as another imperialist policy from the United 
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States.88 Therefore, Iranian people are determined to bring democracy by themselves and 
this will most probably require more years for a desired solution on Iran’s nuclear quest. 
Although a limited but comprehensive military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities is 
argued to be feasible for the United States, the actual possibility of success of this 
surgical type of operation is very low indeed. The reason is that, in contrast to Iraq’s 
Osirak nuclear reactor that was destroyed by Israeli fighters, Iran’s nuclear program does 
not include a single key target for halting the nuclear program.89 The diversity and large 
number of production facilities are due to the nature of the process of uranium 
enrichment, and it is very difficult to trace the number of additional facilities, believed to 
be nineteen.90 Pinpointing all nuclear facilities as key targets, spread over a vast territory, 
requires highly precise intelligence from the United States and Israel. The current level of 
ambiguous intelligence on these facilities is far from being precise.91 Therefore, even 
successful militarily attacks would not have the desired results of suspending Iran’s 
nuclear program substantially. 
Iran’s nuclear facilities are mostly underground and defended both actively and 
passively. These numerous potential targets require a massive effort to contain the 
violence projected in an escalated conflict with Iran. As S. Ritter highlights, “According 
to U.S. military planners, an attack on Iran, even if it was limited in scope to Iran’s 
nuclear activities, would rapidly spin out of control into a regional conflict that could not 
be contained.”92 For this reason, the U.S. military is also ambivalent about the viability of 
a contained surgical air strike on Iran. In such an operation with or without the support of 
its allies, “The United States would rapidly find itself embroiled in another land war 
which it lacked the resources to sustain. Any military strike against Iran, the military 
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believed, would quickly become a fight to the finish, with the ultimate outcome in 
doubt.”93 It is believed that the Bush administration, after its prolonged failure in 
liberating Iraq, will not to pursue another land war in dealing with Iran, which would 
definitely require more resources.94 
The absence of multilateral commitment on economic sanctions to roll back Iran’s 
nuclear program also shows itself in the U.S. engagement in Iran with “carrot and 
stick.”95 Moreover, Americans and Iranians have another problem of perception on 
certain definitions of economic incentive and sanction. As Kibaroglu argues: 
It seems that Americans and Iranians attribute different meanings to the 
same word. For Iranians, engagement means economic benefits while 
nuclear activities—including uranium enrichment—continue under 
stringent inspections. For Americans, engagement means eventual 
normalization of economic and even political relations provided Iran quits 
enrichment indefinitely, changes its attitude toward Israel, and gives up its 
support of Hezbollah.96 
While Iran sees its uranium enrichment program as within its sovereignty rights 
and opposes a halt to its enrichment process and further tries to gain more efficient 
centrifuges in addition to its 3,000 working centrifuges, the United Nations’ resolution 
imposing new sanctions does not seem successful in gaining Iran’s compliance.97 Iran, 
with its 25-year closed economy under the sanctions of U.S. “dual containment” policies, 
is interested in neither incentives nor sanctions.98 
Being a NATO member from 1952 in the eastern periphery of destabilization and 
Cold War threats, and a close ally to the United States, Turkey might be seen as a 
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potential supporter of a coercive military strike on Iran; however, recent U.S.-Turkey 
relations were seriously damaged by the Iraq war, and Turkey’s unhappiness increased 
with U.S. policies toward the Kurdish groups in northern Iraq. Perception of the allegedly 
U.S. help to Kurds to build an independent state, regardless of what the American 
diplomats are asserting publicly, has been the main source of “Anti-Americanism” in 
Turkey. Some Turkish analysts even argue that “a confrontation with the U.S. over 
northern Iraq is not a far-fetched scenario.”99 
The most significant policy divergence with the United States occurred when the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly did not authorize Turkish territory to be used for 
deployment of American troops for a support attack on Iraq from the North, despite 
heavy pressure from the Bush administration.100 Although that decision was surprising 
even for Gul administration (Justice and Development Government), Washington harshly 
criticized the vote and blamed the Turkish Armed Forces for not putting enough pressure 
on the administration for the resolution.101 This criticism of course prompted Turkish 
politicians to respond in an equally harsh manner stating that, “The United States most 
probably sees Turkey as a tribe rather than a democracy.”102 
Although the bitterness of the relationship was mitigated after the Turkish 
resolution crisis, “the absence of a close ongoing dialogue on current issues at the highest 
level — previously a hallmark of U.S.-Turkish relations — testifies to the continuing lack 
of warmth in the relationship.”103 That bitter tone, however, is not the main factor why 
Turkey would not support a U.S. military action on Iran, although there has not been a 
request from the United States yet. The probable opposition to a war on Iran would be 
due to the further stability concern of Ankara in the Middle East and the core goal of 
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Turkey’s foreign policy to act as a mediating power between the East and the West. A 
war on Iran would have different implications for Turkey than the Iraq war. Potential 
retaliation of Tehran is a higher threat then that of Baghdad. Iran, in contrast to Saddam’s 
Iraq, would not feel restrained to retaliate against Turkey if Turkey actively joined a 
strike on Iran or supported the U.S. forces logistically. Iraq’s integrity, along with the 
prevention of the emergence of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, is and will remain a top 
priority for Turkish secular elites. A possible regime change with a so-called 
democratization process in Iran after a military intervention, though unlikely, is not 
desirable for Turkey. While the deteriorated situation and stability of Northern Iraq 
maintains its importance, the emergence of additional clashes, especially those adjacent 
to Turkey’s eastern borders, would not be acceptable for Turkey. 
2. Israel 
The statements of President Ahmadinejad about Israel and Zionism have 
increased Israel’s concerns over Iran’s nuclear program.104 Israel repeatedly stated that 
Iran’s nuclear program is a clear threat for Israel and Israel is decisive on preventing Iran 
from becoming a de facto nuclear state. Officials repeatedly highlighted that Israel would 
not be deterred from the difficulty of a military operation or international reaction.105 
The successful Israeli attack on an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 and its small but 
high technology military power might propel Israeli officials to adopt a more assertive 
stance on the military strike option when necessary, but Iran also seems to have learned a 
lot from the Osirak attack. Iran’s nuclear project is well defended and dispersed. On top 
of that, Iran is believed to be pursuing a dual track—the uranium and the plutonium 
track—on its uranium enrichment process for redundancy.106 The real number of key 
nuclear facilities is claimed to be unknown by Israeli and U.S. intelligence.107 Besides, 
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Iran in anticipation of an Israeli preventive strike is believed to have built most of its 
nuclear facilities far from its western borders. It can be argued that the Bushier nuclear 
power plant, being so close to the Persian Gulf, is vulnerable to Israeli air attacks; 
however, the Bushier power plant according to S. Brom, “… is not really a part of Iran’s 
military nuclear program, and it mostly serves as an excuse for an Iranian wish to have 
control over the full fuel cycle, namely building a capacity for uranium enrichment.”108 A 
strike on the Bushier power plant would not inflict any considerable damage on Iran’s 
program. 
Israel, in contrast to the United States, does not have sufficient military 
capabilities to conduct a comprehensive air strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities on its own. 
This kind of strike would require a 3,000 to 3,500 kilometer two-way flight range from 
Israeli air bases. This range would need to be extended if passage through Jordanian or 
Iraqi air space was not granted. Turkey and India are among the other options of Israeli 
alliance, but current good relations of these countries with Iran and fear of destabilization 
in the region would be another difficulty for facilitating an Israeli air strike. Despite the 
fact that Iranian air defense systems are relatively obsolete in comparison with Israel’s 
improved countermeasure capabilities, Iran’s dispersed and heavily deployed air defense 
systems, especially around the nuclear facilities, would further complicate such an 
operation for military planners.109 The conclusion is that current Israeli military 
capabilities are far from able to sustain such a complicated air strike that would destroy 
all of the necessary targets for halting the Iranian nuclear program for good. Iran’s 
response to a military strike as S. Brom states, “… would be either to withdraw from the 
NPT, or to rally Islamic Jihadists to wage a war against the Unites States and its allies 
more directly.”110  
There seems to be another option of “initiating a Middle East nuclear restraint 
effort that would help isolate Iran as a regional producer of fissile materials” for Israel 
other than striking Iran. As Henry Sokolski argues: 
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Israel should announce that it will unilaterally mothball (but not yet 
dismantle) Dimona, and place the reactor’s mothballing under IAEA 
monitoring. At the same time, Israel should announce that it is prepared to 
dismantle Dimona and place the special nuclear 17 material it has 
produced in “escrow” in Israel with a third trusted declared nuclear state, 
e.g., the United States. It should make clear, however, that Israel will only 
take this additional step when at least two of three Middle Eastern nations 
(i.e., Algeria, Egypt, or Iran) follow Israel’s lead by mothballing their own 
declared nuclear facilities that are capable of producing at least one 
bomb’s worth of plutonium or highly enriched uranium in 1 to 3 years.111 
This initiation is believed to have motivated Algeria, Egypt, and Iran to dismantle 
their fissile producing facilities and formally agree not to redeploy nuclear weapons in 
the Middle East. However, this would not be a viable option for Israel if those countries 
did not accept the initiation. The United States must act as a motivator to European 
countries in supporting Algeria, Egypt, and especially Iran to build non-nuclear energy 
facilities with their infrastructure and know-how abilities. But this option relies heavily 
on the willingness of Iran and the attractiveness of non-nuclear energy sources that 
European countries will supply. Ambiguous Israeli nuclear strategy, which Israeli 
officials see as the very reason for their existence in a hostile environment, and Iranian 
national pride on its nuclear energy program are important factors that reduce the 
applicability of such a proposal in the near future. 
Close cooperation between Turkey and Israel began with the Turkish diplomatic 
decision at the end of 1991, “when Turkey decided to upgrade its diplomatic relations 
with Israel to ambassadorial level.”112 This initiation by Turkey started mutual high-level 
visits and expanded bilateral trade to significant amounts with high-level military 
cooperation. In 1996, Turkey and Israel reached a military agreement and cooperation in 
intelligence gathering and electric surveillance on Turkey’s southeastern and eastern 
borders. The agreement also allowed Israeli jets to fly and participate in air exercises with 
the Turkish Air Force in Turkey. Turkish Phantoms’ modernization by the Israeli defense 
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industry and the purchase of Popeye-1 air to ground stand-off missiles were also within 
the agreement. But it is argued that in fact the military agreement between Israel and 
Turkey is not an alliance as Efrahim Inbar argues: 
The entente between the two capitals is clearly not a military alliance in 
the traditional sense; the two countries have not defined a casus 
foederis…. There is no commitment to mutual defense or formal military 
coordination for future contingencies. They both fear entrapment in crises 
of limited relevance to their own national security and neither expects the 
other to participate actively in its wars.113 
Although it is claimed that “Turkish and Israeli military and civilian officials 
appear to have discussed ‘joint threats’ as part of their strategic cooperation,”114 there is 
no official explanation as to what extent Iran and its nuclear ambitions were discussed. 
Potential deficiency in intelligence on Iran nuclear targets and the difficulty of 
conducting a comprehensive strike, along with the retaliation threat from Iran exclusively 
by its missiles and inclusively by its support of terrorism would pose a great challenge for 
Turkey in supporting its recent military partner. 
Israel might be encouraged with its successful Osiraq attack, because “the 
political price it had to pay eventually was insignificant; U.S. sanctions were limited and 
stopped after a short time and the negative effect on its relations with other states also 
subsided very quickly.”115 Israel has the freedom to be a strong advocate of preventive 
strikes on Iran, because it perceives that, despite some Arab states’ possible strong 
objection and condemnation of Israeli aggressiveness, the same states would also feel 
relieved since a nuclear Iran is also a threat to them.116 In contrast to Israeli freedom, 
Turkey does not have the same liberty to participate actively in or support an exclusive 
Israeli or a U.S.-Israel coalition’s military strike on Iran. With its fragile economy and 
dependence on its neighbors, namely Iran, the Erdogan administration, who tries to build 
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and strengthen a bridge between East and West in its quest for E.U. membership would 
find it difficult to support such action. Thus this perception will make Turkey a solid 
defender to multilateral solutions and propel it to comply with a European approach other 
than bilateral coalitions. 
3. European Union 
The European Union is deliberate and prefers diplomacy first on dealing with the 
nuclear-Iran problem. Although Europe’s reluctance to get involved as a hardliner in the 
United States-Iran nuclear standoff is criticized by the Bush administration, the three 
Foreign Ministers of the European Union, namely the United Kingdom, France, and 
Germany made their first official visits to Tehran in order to persuade Iranians to sign the 
Additional Protocol set by International Atomic Energy Agency in 2003.117 Since then, 
the three countries maintained their negotiations with Iran about the confrontation with 
the United States on stopping its uranium enrichment program. The EU diplomacy 
approach proved to be successful to a certain degree, since Iran voluntarily agreed to halt 
all its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities temporarily on 15 November 2004 
as a result of these negotiations.118 But when Iran reportedly failed on its suspension, the 
United States criticized EU initiatives to give more time to Iran on its road to nuclear 
weapons.119 The European Union’s diplomacy approach is based on giving incentives to 
Tehran as alternatives to its civilian atomic energy program; however, as Sokolski 
argues: 
As for negotiating directly with Tehran to limit its declared nuclear 
program an — approach preferred by most of America’s European allies 
this — too seems self-defeating. First, any deal the Iranian regime would 
agree to would only validate that the NPT legally allows its members to 
acquire all the capabilities Iran mastered. Second, it would foster the view  
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internationally that the only risk in violating required NPT inspections 
would be to be caught and then bribed to limit only those activities the 
inspectors managed to discover.120 
On top of that, Tehran repeatedly highlighted that it was not interested in a 
European Union offer of incentives in return for a halt to its nuclear program, as Iranian 
Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi stated: 
If Europe is seeking diplomatic and peaceful solutions, it must not go 
beyond international treaties…. No incentives are better than 
implementing the NPT and the IAEA rules without discrimination…. Iran 
had informed the European side at the beginning of the negotiations that 
the aim is to make fuel for peaceful purposes, and Iran is not seeking 
anything beyond its rights and would not accept commitments beyond 
that…. It looks like after three years of negotiations and Iran's clear 
position Mr. Solana [EU foreign policy chief] still has doubts about Iran's 
rights. This is really surprising.121 
Tehran’s denial of European incentives and its failure to suspend its enrichment 
program forced the European Union to accept resolution 1696 under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter. The resolution demanded that “Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related and 
reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA,” 
and threatened further action, including possible economic and diplomatic sanctions in 
case of noncompliance.122 Economic sanctions aim to compel Iranian leaders to change 
their minds and abandon nuclear weapon capabilities by inflicting enough pain on Iran’s 
economy once it secured nuclear weapons rather than only trying to prevent its nuclear 
weapon quest. In this manner, a nuclear Iran might be isolated politically by a loss of 
international respect. The desire to be integrated into the international community with 
Iranian’s significant pride of Persian identity has considerable effects on well-educated 
young Iran reformers. Iran’s hardliners, however, such as the Revolutionary Guard and 
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the Guardian Council, do not seem afraid of Iran’s isolation.123 Thus this perception 
reduces the chances of the isolation approach as an effective tool in near future. 
Iran is highly dependent on its export revenues and foreign investments for 
sustained economic growth. The high unemployment rate is another important factor that 
affects its economic growth.  Multilateral economic sanctions to cut off investment and 
exports could deprive Iran of highly needed capital and thus growth. Sanctions on natural 
gas exports would impose heavy pressure, but reducing foreign investment would have 
“dramatic effects on Iran’s economy,” because Iran lacks the capacity and infrastructure 
to utilize its natural gas resources.124 Iran is in great need of machinery, transportation 
vehicles, chemical products, iron, and steel for increasing its gas exports.125 
For these reasons, the European Union can be argued to have a great influence on 
Iran’s behavior with respect to its nuclear program; however, the main challenge to 
sanctions for a rollback is to provide and maintain the international community’s 
cooperation and support for sanctions against Iran.  France, Germany, Italy, and the U.K 
will probably face a difficult choice about whether to adopt economic sanctions on Iran, 
because their current economic relations with Iran are so important for their own 
prosperities. Another difficulty lies with South Korea, China, and Japan, since “China 
receives one-sixth of its oil from Iran, Japan imports one-tenth, and 5 percent of South 
Korea’s total oil needs come from Iran.”126  It will be very difficult to obtain subtle 
support from China and Japan on economic sanctions because of their distance from an 
Iranian nuclear threat along with their reliance on oil coming from Iran. 
Current enhanced economic relations and security cooperation against PKK will 
force Turkey to retain a strong preference for multilateral approaches on dealing with a 
nuclear Iran. The current administration in Ankara predominantly views Iran as not an 
imminent threat, in contrast to Turkey’s secular elite. In this context, Turkey’s bid to 
become a member of the European Union will play a crucial and determining role in 
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shaping Turkey’s official stance against nuclear-Iran. As mentioned, the EU strongly 
prefers soft diplomacy as a first option in resolving the issue and this is also beneficial for 
the Erdogan administration, which focused on domestic reforms and economic growth 
rather than external security debates in forming Turkish policies. But, EU capabilities to 
project efficient military power in the Middle East are very restricted in contrast to the 
United States, and this is one of the main reasons for the EU to adapt diplomacy first. 
Actually, as R. Russell highlights: 
The Europeans are all too willing to let political and military problems in 
the Middle East fester, to step aside and let the Americans carry the lion’s 
share of the region’s political-military burdens, and to eagerly criticize 
American policy for failing to deliver a “perpetual peace” to the troubled 
region.127 
The Erdogan administration would imitate the Europeans deliberate approach of 
“waiting, watching and condemning the United States unilateralism” when necessary if a 
nuclear-Iran chose not to alter its current good relations with Turkey, which in reality 
depends on balance of power. However, the European Union’s inefficiency in projecting 
military power to the Middle East might propel Turkey to align itself with the American 
and Israeli hardliner approach, only if Tehran exclusively threatened Turkey with its 
future nuclear weapons. Besides, the EU might reconsider Turkey’s membership with the 
implication of a nuclear Iran. A nuclear-weapon-capable Iran, as Russell argues, “… 
might reinforce existing European wariness regarding the security ‘baggage’ Turkey 
brings to the table…. Will the EU want to acquire a formal border with Iraq, Syria, and a 
nuclear armed Iran?”128 Such reconsideration will force Turkey to look for more practical 
options and thus will coerce it to take demanding stance before its NATO alliance or 
consider its internal counterbalancing options against a nuclear-Iran. 
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4. NATO 
NATO would play an important role as a coercive force only if all member states 
acknowledged a future U.N. Security Council’s military intervention on Iran. Such a 
decision, despite its low probability of support by the international community, would 
bring NATO into the Persian Gulf as an important actor. Drawing NATO exclusively into 
the Middle East is seen as more preferable by the Arab Gulf States because they see a 
greater European security involvement via the NATO alliance as a “checks and balance” 
system to the unilateral U.S. actions against Iran. On the other hand, the United States 
would feel relieved by bringing some legitimacy to its actions against Iran.129 
Turkey’s security perception about the missile proliferation in the Middle East 
was relatively relaxed in comparison to its Western allies in NATO and Israel. Having its 
economic centers and dense population far from the Middle East was the main reason for 
this perception; however, with an increase in those missiles’ range, that perception left 
itself to new security concerns.130 NATO’s “first-use” strategy on nuclear weapons, “at 
least in its official statements,” which means that NATO may be the first to use nuclear 
weapons in an aggression when necessary rather than preemptively, was embraced by 
Turkey, and sufficient enough in deterring and denying the use of nuclear weapons in the 
Cold War era.131 
The 1990–1991 Gulf War changed the Turkish strategic perceptions very deeply 
regarding WMD and missile risks. Turkey in contrast to Israel did not become a target of 
Iraqi Scud missiles; however, there was still a considerable threat for Turkey since Turgut 
Ozal’s administration exclusively supported the Gulf War coalition and facilitated 
Incirlik Air Base for allied air operations. But the NATO alliance was slow and reluctant  
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to increase missile defense reinforcement in Turkey, and military officials anxiously 
realized that crowded but classic Turkish forces were far from responding to the missile 
and WMD threats.132 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks, however, caused radical changes to threat perceptions 
and made classical deterrent theories questionable against newly emerged non-state 
actors and increased probability of unauthorized use of nuclear weapons by terrorists 
groups. For Turkey it has become clear that NATO failed to or preferred not to respond 
in its solidarity to newly emerged crises by focusing on the legitimacy of a Global War 
on Terrorism rather than discussing the invoking of Article V.133 Article V states that all 
NATO members promise to assist against any kind of aggression against a NATO 
member and its territorial integrity. In this manner, European allies gave their immediate 
support to the United States after terrorist attacks to wage a war against Afghanistan. 
However, when the Bush administration marched for Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, 
Europe showed reluctance and debated the legitimacy of such an   intervention. 
Consequents were felt especially when Turkey wanted the alliance to enact Article IV in 
preparation for a possible Article V invoking. But Turkey’s demand was harshly opposed 
by France and Germany.134 
European allies openly showed their opposition to taking such responsibilities to 
support one of its member’s vital security interests. This Turkish officials start to think 
twice about NATO’s actual commitment to Turkey’s defense, especially in face of WMD 
proliferation by multiple countries, namely Iran and Iraq in the Middle East.135 Some 
analysts even argued that this thrust issue was another reason why the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly did not give an authorization to U.S. troops for a support attack from 
Turkish soils to Iraq in March 2003.136 This wariness about NATO’s reliability would 
propel Turkey to think about its internal counterbalancing options, especially if Europe 
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maintained its demanding and unyielding attitude in accepting Turkey’s participation in 
EU and did not commit itself to defending its would-be member Turkey’s vital security 
concerns in the near future in the Middle East. 
C. INTERNAL COUNTERBALANCING 
The European Union’s membership process and economic relations with Iran will 
have a great impact on whether Ankara chooses multilateral solutions rather than bilateral 
coalitions approaching Iran’s nuclear quest. The recent progress Ankara made over 
participating in the EU will inevitably coerce Turkey to act in accordance with the EU 
political approach by imposing economic sanctions against Iran and forcing it to rely on 
NATO alliances other than the U.S. and Israel coalitions for its security. But as the first 
section revealed, there has been a rising liability concern among Turkish security elite in 
trusting NATO alliances’ commitment to Turkey in practical terms. Referring to the 
Turkish security elite does not necessarily imply the Turkish Armed Forces, since 
especially after the Cold War the Turkish public began to voice their opinions about 
foreign policies and security debates of Turkey. In this regard, NATO’s short-term 
possible failures to respond Turkey’s anxiety about a nuclear Iran, along with the 
European Union’s additional ignorance of Turkey’s security perceptions and its lack of 
capabilities to timely project military power in crises, will inevitably guide Turkey to 
consider practical measures, namely going nuclear after Iran or hardening its defensive 
capabilities denying and deterring WMD use against itself. Both options would have 
implications since, being a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT), Turkey would face serious pressure from the international arena, and a 
buildup of its defensive capabilities and hardening of its missile defense systems would 
attract attention from its neighbors. 
1. A Nuclear Turkey 
Turkey, being a state party to the NPT and a voluntarily ratifier of additional 
IAEA protocols, has never sought the ways to become a nuclear-weapon-capable state 
and is unlikely to become one in the future; however, as Turkish scholar Mustafa 
Kibaroglu argues: 
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The loyalty of an increasing number of Turks, especially from the younger 
generations, be they in politics, in academia, in the military or in state 
bureaucracy, to the norms of the nonproliferation regimes cannot be taken 
for granted indefinitely, if the United States and the European Union fail 
to convince Iran to forego the nuclear weapons option. Otherwise, Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions may trigger young Turks to think nuclear more 
seriously.137 
It is important to examine Turkey’s nuclear activities in order to determine future 
capabilities and assess whether Turkey might become another nuclear proliferator in the 
case that “young Turks” start to consider nuclear options in the face of security 
challenges. 
It’s important to highlight that currently there are no nuclear power reactors in 
Turkey other than two small research reactors, but in the shadow of energy shortfalls, 
building a nuclear power station has become a highly debated issue. Turkey’s nuclear 
power research started with the establishment of the Cekmece Nuclear Research and 
Training Center (CNRTC) with a one megawatt thermal pool type research rector in 
1962. Later in 1966 the Nuclear Research and Training Center (ANRTC) was established 
for planning and utilizing Turkey’s natural uranium reserves. Feasibility studies were 
conducted for the construction of a 300- to 400-megawatt reactor; however, economic 
and political crises halted the project. Later similar research was conducted in 1972 to 
install a 600-megawatt reactor, but again the project was interrupted by military 
intervention in 1980.138 
After 1981, Ankara sought to install a nuclear reactor in Sinop and Akkuyu by 
beginning talks with seven foreign nuclear energy supplier firms including Atomic 
Energy of Canada, Kraftwerk Union of Germany, and General Electric of the United 
States. Negotiations with General Electric ended prematurely since, according to the firm, 
a reactor in Sinop would not be feasible due to seismic threats in Black Sea. The German 
firm Kraftwerk Union withdrew from the negotiations, later claiming this was because of 
financing conditions. Atomic Energy of Canada accepted the agreement; however, 
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financing became a problem in the building of three major reactors for the firm and the 
firm’s fund request was rejected by Canadian government. The Canadian 
administration’s request from Turkey to finance the reactors was inconsistent with initial 
agreements of “build-operate-transfer;” therefore, again, the quest for nuclear power was 
halted.139 
Another important factor was claimed to be political, since Pakistani and Turkish 
relations showed considerable improvement with new Turkish President Kenan Evren 
(former Chief of the Turkish General Staff) and General President Zia ul-Haq, and this 
close relationship was perceived as a new quest for Pakistan to acquire a new transfer 
way for its nuclear bomb. The Pakistan enrichment program had been blocked by NATO 
in early 1980, and the Greek Prime Minister claimed that, “Pakistan expected Turkey to 
act as a trans-shipper of material for a nuclear bomb and would reciprocate by proudly 
sharing the nuclear bomb technology with Turkey.”140 Such a claim was sufficient 
enough to raise concerns from the United States and the West to approach Turkey’s 
nuclear power programs deliberately, and those concerns showed their effects explicitly 
when Turkey reached an agreement with Argentina for technical assistance including 
nuclear fuel cycle research on power and reactor planning, construction, and operation. 
The initial phase was to build a 25-megawatt research reactor for these purposes; 
however, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Germany put great pressure on 
Argentina in regard to Turkey’s nuclear ambitions. Fear and pressure of those countries 
caused the agreement to slow down its progress, and later the agreement to build a 
research reactor was cancelled by the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (ATEA).141 
Further projects were discussed throughout 1997 and the 2000s with other foreign firms, 
including the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), for determining and 
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evaluating Turkey’s nuclear development and possible contractors, but these efforts came 
to halt also because of Turkey’s economic problems.142 
Too many attempts and failures, on the other hand, supplied Turkey with a well-
educated cadre of Turkish scientists, scholars, and technicians in the fields of nuclear 
engineering and nuclear physics. Turkey can be argued to have a nuclear weapon 
production capability, as Bowen and Kidd highlight in their article: 
Almost all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle have been examined in Turkey 
except uranium enrichment… Turkey appears to have one facility capable 
of engaging in conversion activities, a fuel pilot plant at the Cekmece 
Nuclear Research and Training Center…. Relevant experiments have been 
conducted at several universities in Turkey, with research undertaken to 
understand the properties of nuclear fuel and the process of fuel 
fabrication.143 
However, common wisdom depending on open sources suggests that a nuclear-
capable-Turkey is unlikely, given the openness of Turkey’s nuclear research program, 
small uranium reserves, and lack of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities and 
especially international pressure. In this regard, it is difficult to believe that Ankara could 
develop a weapons program in the near future as long as Turkish leaders keep their 
rationality in governing the country.144 
2. Reinforcement of Conventional Capabilities 
Absence of mutual consulting on strategic issues with the United States after the 
2003 Iraq War, implications of Turkish-Israeli cooperation in Arab world, the relatively 
diminished trust in NATO and complicated membership with the European Union along 
with its lack of commitments to Turkey’s security perceptions, and the country’s strong 
commitment to non-proliferation and the challenging road to nuclear weapons will 
inevitably force Turkey to undertake serious precautions to improve its conventional 
capabilities to deter a nuclear Iran. 
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Most Turkish officials and elites relied heavily on protection from NATO and its 
main burden sharer, the United States.145 Being a member of NATO, Turkey watched 
WMD proliferation in a relaxed but deliberate manner, and sometimes this relaxed view 
extended to the denial of threats, as in the case of Saddam’s Iraq and Syria.146 But the 
1990–1991 Gulf War changed this deliberate perception rapidly, because when Turkish 
Prime Minister Ozal asked for a rapid-response force from NATO against a Scud missile 
threat, the Patriots (anti-missile defense systems) arrived too late and most of the Belgian 
fighter planes were not active for a rapid response. On the other hand, the first Gulf War 
also affected public opinion, which started to gradually voice its concerns on defense-
related matters. Successful interceptions of most SCUD missiles by Patriots over Israeli 
air space have showed the need for addressing the missile threat for Turkish Armed 
Forces.  Until that time, Turkey’s military buildup was thought to be enough to deter and 
defend against any attacks that would emerge from Syria, Iran, and Iraq. Although 
Turkey was not attacked during the first Gulf War, the outstanding increase in missile 
ranges forced Turkey to think twice about its conventional deterrence capabilities.147 
An exclusive indication of this perception is Israel’s cooperation and 
collaboration in defining a new strategy for Turkish Armed Forces with increased 
mobility, forward abilities, endurance, and the capability of rapid intervention in crises. 
With a large part of its budget dedicated to defense expenditures, despite the fact that this 
has been debated by the public recently, Turkey still enjoys a formidable military power 
in comparison with its neighbors. This superiority,  however, is still far from addressing 
the strategic and tactical missile threats from its neighbors, in this case, Iran. 
The 1998 Iran tests of the Shahab-3 ballistic missile with a range of 1,300 km and 
a payload of about 750 kg raised questions, especially in Israel, which is well within 
range of the missile.148 Likewise, Turkey felt threatened. Besides, Iran is claimed to be 
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developing Shahab-4, with a range of 2,000 kilometers and a payload of 1,000 kg. 
Shahab-4 is reported to be a multi-staged missile that will be capable of executing a 
ballistic trajectory to stress the Israeli Arrow missile defense. This missile, if used with 
lighter payloads, is believed to be able to target all of Western Europe.149 
Turkey, in response to those threats, would choose to counterbalance Iran with 
proliferation of medium-range ballistic missiles; however, such policies would have 
serious implications to its multilateral alliances and its close neighbors. Turkey’s current 
defense modernization on its early warning and missile defense systems, which aims 
detecting, tracking, and intercepting and striking capabilities, is already an attractive 
security phenomenon for Russia and especially Greece. Therefore, Turkey’s decision and 
quest for medium-range missile capabilities would be regarded with alarming concerns 
from Russia, Syria, and Greece. 
In the line of defense policies within NATO, Turkey might choose defensive 
systems rather than offensive. A military modernization program is already in progress, 
including F-4E fighter modernization with improved air-to-ground capabilities, four 
airborne early warning (AWACS) systems, Popeye-II air-to-ground precision stand-off 
missile co-production and the purchase of additional tanker airplanes. On top of that, 
Iranian improved missile threats might force Ankara to think more seriously about theater 
missile defense systems.150 Although there is still no significant progress in the theater 
missile defense system concept of Ankara, a nuclear Iran will definitely accelerate such 
defense options. 
D. CONCLUSION 
For almost fifty years, Turkey has been exposed to proliferation developments on 
its borders and nuclear weapons deployed on its territory, both because of having borders 
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with potential nuclear states such as Syria and Iraq and because of having lived under the 
protective umbrella of NATO, mainly supported by the United States in the Cold War 
era. 
Although not being a nuclear state and not likely to become one in the near future, 
Turkey is highly aware of the instability of the Middle East; however, Turkey’s current 
policy approach to Iran, which is believed to be proceeding to a nuclear weapon level, is 
not defined yet and does not have yellow or red lines dissuading Iran. Turkish Prime 
Minister Erdogan’s statement that “The continuation of Iran's nuclear program for 
peaceful ends is a natural right, but it is impossible to support it if it concerns the 
development of weapons of mass destruction” does not give any indication of how 
Turkey will act against the situation. Additionally, then president Abdullah Gul’s 
statements about not permitting and giving support to any kind of military prevention 
within Turkey’s borders discourage the United States and Israel for facilitation but do not 
explain how Turkey’s behavior would be in consideration of sanctions. 
If ambiguity is a determined state policy, then Turkey’s current stance has nothing 
to do with regard to persuading Iran not to proceed to the next level; however, if 
ambiguity is a source of not knowing what to do, then more troubled and bloodier days 
could be on the borders of Turkey in near future. Thus, Turkey must choose its stance and 
take necessary precautions for different scenarios. Trying to become a friend to everyone 










IV. IMPACT OF A MILITARY INTERVENTION ON IRAN FOR 
TURKEY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
During the Cold War, Turkey felt the communist threat explicitly due to its border 
with the Soviet Union. Its strategic location increased its relations with the West and 
Turkey became a member of NATO. The dissolution of the Soviet Union reduced direct 
contact with the communist threat from Turkey’s eastern border. In the early 1990s, it 
was argued that without a Soviet threat, Turkey would not be an important ally in the 
West’s defense. Owing to the emergence of new states in Central Asia and oil politics in 
the Middle East, however, Turkey drew attention again with its central location between 
Europe and the Asia, especially after the 1990–1991 Gulf War. 
The Gulf War brought importance to Turkey’s political environment; at the same 
time, costs became too much for Turkey to bear. A Kurdish contingency in Northern Iraq 
became a playground to the PKK for staging attacks on Turkey, and Turkey lost its 
former economic partner—Iraq. These factors, as well as the insufficient compensation 
that Turkey received after the war, made Turkey worried about another war on Iraq in 
2003. European allies’ opposition to the Turkish proposal enacting Article IV in order to 
invoke properly Article V when necessary showed Europe’s and namely NATO’s loose 
commitments to its member security in the Middle East. The U.S. disappointment about 
its troop deployment from Turkish soil to northern Iraq and, afterward,s the detainment of 
Turkish Special Forces—the hood incident—in Sulaymaniyah by U.S. forces deteriorated 
Turkey-U.S. relations. 
Although both the Turkish and U.S. governments focused on revitalizing the 
bitter tone of relationship, the absence of U.S. commitment to stopping PKK terrorism in 
northern Iraq has maintained its significance. Economical, political and military impacts 
of the two Gulf Wars had profound side effects on the Turkish political elite, and this has 
made Turkey think twice before acting and supporting unilateral U.S. actions or 
coalitions with Israel, especially when they involve hot conflicts with Turkey’s 
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neighbors. This chapter will attempt to answer why Turkey feels reluctant to participate 
in a possible military strike or to facilitate U.S. and Israeli operations to Iran in order to 
roll back its allegedly nuclear-weapons program. Then Prime Minister Abdullah Gul’s 
reiterated statements about not supporting any hot conflicts adjacent to Turkey’s borders 
are seen as an explicit stance of Turkey against any intervention on Iran. On the other 
hand, Turkey’s heavy defense reliance on the United States and strategic alliance is 
argued to leave little space for such emotional attitudes from Turkey.151 
B. IMPLICATIONS OF THE TWO GULF WARS 
Along with Turkey’s increased political importance in the West, the Gulf War 
also had negative effects, especially in the realm of economics and security. Both pre-war 
and after-war economic sanctions had detrimental affects on Turkey’s economy. The 
Iraqi Kurds have made considerable progress toward their dream quest of establishing a 
de facto Kurdish state in Northern Iraq with the indirect help of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 688 and protection of the Allied Poised Hammer forces on 
southeastern Turkish soil.152 The costs were too much for the fragile Turkish economy, 
which did not get any significant aid after the war. Likewise, the Iraq War in 2003 caused 
concerns and had more important implications than the Gulf War of 1991. Loss of trust 
became an important issue to European allies of NATO. Compensation from another war 
on Iraq was also important and not handled clearly in negotiations with the United States. 
Turkish denial of basing U.S. troops on Turkish soil disappointed the United States and 
caused a tension between the two allies. While stabilization of fragile Iraq is vital for the 
Unites States, the U.S. is not doing enough about PKK camps located in northern Iraq 
from the Turkish perspective. This complicates the Turkish foreign policy toward the  
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region. For these reasons, the economic impact of two Gulf Wars and Turkey’s security-
related perceptions help in identifying the reason for Turkish reluctance for another war 
in the Middle East. 
1. Economic Implications 
The first and immediate effect of the 1990–1991 Gulf War was the loss of Iraq’s 
economy for Turkey. During and especially after the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq was normally 
Turkey's most important market in the region. Likewise, Iraq was also dependent on the 
pipeline from Kirkuk to Yumurtalik for transferring half of its oil exports.153 With the 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 688 economic sanctions against Iraqi government, and 
oil that was formerly being exported to Turkey was being smuggled between Turkish oil-
truckers and Iraqi Kurds. Though the real amount of smuggling through the Habur 
border—the only functional border during the war—where over 800 oil-trucks were 
passing through in a day, was difficult to estimate, the effects were believed to be 
tremendous for the Turkish oil economy.154 
The exact amount of the costs to Turkey in the Gulf War is far from certainty 
because of the diversity of the aspects included in different estimates; however, it’s 
argued that sole price for the war was at $3.4 billion. In other words, it was 4.9 per cent 
of Turkish GNP.155 But the overall cost that included economic sanctions, loss of 
revenues from the oil pipeline, uncollected bank loans given to Iraq, stopped export to 
Iraq, and sharp decline in truck transportation created great social and economic 
problems. Moreover, construction, trade, and tourism revenues decreased after the first 
Gulf War. Considering all these costs, State Minister Kemal Dervis asserted that 
Turkey’s economic losses were between $40 billion and $45 billion.156 
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In this sense, the consequences of the war were more devastating for Turkey than 
Ozal had foreseen. Iraq was an important market for Turkey’s exports, and terminating its 
economic relations due to the U.N. sanctions affected Turkey’s economy. The 2003 Iraq 
War had similar effects on Turkey, with increased PKK terrorism resulting in over a 
hundred deaths of Turkish truck drivers. Any attempt to intervene in Iran would be a 
reminder of the Iraq War and economic sanctions for Turkey, who has bitter memories 
concerning the past. The possibility of losing its important gas source—Iran—would 
prevent Turkey from engaging in harsh policies for a rollback on Iran’s nuclear program. 
Being a main supplier for the Turkish energy market, Iran also sends a considerable 
amount of its people to Turkey as tourists and serves as a primary pillar for Turkish trade 
with Central Asia.157 At a broader level, the Turks also have serious reasons for concern 
about the negative impact that growing regional tensions and the possibility of conflict 
would have on foreign investment and, consequently, on the management of the growing 
Turkish current accounts deficit. 
2. Security Implications 
Saddam’s Anfal operation to mass murder Iraqi Kurds by destroying their villages 
and using poisonous gas on them forced the United Nations Security Council to adopt 
Resolution 688 calling for an immediate end to repression of Saddam’s government. In 
addition, a response force was established in Turkey’s southeastern region and a no-
flight-zone was formed north of the 36th parallel. The area north of the parallel was also 
off limits to Iraqi soldiers in order to protect Iraqi Kurds from Saddam’s regime.158 
Turkey under the administration of Ozal supported the U.N. Resolution to defend 
Iraqi Kurds against Iraqi aggression. Ozal’s other idea was to utilize Iraqi Kurds against 
PKK terrorism in Northern Iraq; thus Turkey became the close supporter of Massoud 
Barzani in the stabilization of Northern Iraq after in 1992. Iraqi Kurds dependent on 
Turkey’s support would be diverted from establishing a Kurdish state thus eliminating the 
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danger of PKK ethnic nationalism. Another reason for Ozal’s support on the issue was to 
prevent another Kurdish refugee problem by having influence over Iraqi Kurds if Saddam 
was to oppress the Kurds again. 
The Kurdish refugee problem became a challenging issue, because in no more 
than two weeks 500,000 refugees were piled up to the borders of Turkey. Remote valleys 
and mountainous territory further made the conditions difficult for humanitarian aids.159 
Another implication of the first Gulf War to Turkey’s security was the 
destabilization in northern Iraq. The turmoil between Barzani and Talabani forces along 
with PKK terrorism turned northern Iraq into a problematic region for Turkey. Turkey 
claimed that Iran as another outsider exploited the lack of authority in northern Iraq and 
supported the PKK with weapons, training, and economic aid and accommodated many 
PKK training camps on the Turkey-Iran border.160 
However, in aftermath of the 2003 Iraqi War, Iran made a big turn in its foreign 
policy toward the region, as well as Turkey, due to the fact that Iran and Syria were 
concerned about potential Iraqi territorial disintegration in the future. In this regard, Iran 
relieved itself from thinking about Turkey’s claimed goal to reach and control the oil 
fields of Mosul and Kirkuk. 
In contrast to the U.S. policy of isolating Iran from the political arena in the 
Middle East, Turkey after the 2003 Iraqi War has chosen to improve its ties with Iran, 
fearing the emergence of a Kurdish state. The emergence of a Kurdish state is not 
acceptable to Turkey, Iran, or Syria; because their territorial integrity would be in danger 
if an independent Kurdish state tacitly or exclusively spurred ethnic Kurdish nationalism 
by demanding soils from these states. 
C. TURKEY’S CONCERNS ABOUT U.S. RELATIONS 
Until the 2003 Iraqi War, it was not common to come across “Anti-Americanism” 
in Turkish literature, except among writings of Turkish extreme leftists who perceived 
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U.S. policies as imperialistic. However, the Bush administration’s war against global 
terrorism, with its exaggeration of the alleged ties between Al-Qaeda and Iraq, had 
controversial effects on the Turkish public. Europe’s legitimacy concerns about Bush’s 
war plans on Iraq were also reflected in Turkey. 
The United States, being accustomed to seeing Turkey as a close supporter in the 
region, was surprised at the Turkish vote to deny U.S. troop deployment to Turkey in 
order to attack to Iraq from the north. In fact, the denial was also a surprise for Turkish 
security elites. The Islamist view of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) had 
affected the vote against the authorization of troop deployment, because many of the 
AKP deputies thought that the United States was waging a war against Muslims in the 
world.161 Another factor for the JDP was said to be its inexperience and absence of 
guidance from the military elite on the issue. In this context, the Turkish military was 
accused by U.S. officials, Chief of the Turkish General Staff Hilmi Ozkok responded by 
stating that the “Security Council was not charged to advise parliament and pressuring 
parliament ‘would not have been democratic’.”162 The United States’ disappointment 
caused it to maintain its harshness against Turkey, since the decision on the vote was seen 
among the major reasons why the United States faced continuous post-war difficulties.163 
Later, detainment of Turkish Special Forces by U.S. forces led to unprecedented 
anger among the Turkish populace. The Turkish press was not late to exploit this 
incident; however, Turks who showed great respect to the military already found the U.S. 
actions indecent and dishonorable.164 The Kurds in northern Iraq took advantage of 
Turkish antipathy toward the United States. Another clumsy attempt was made by the 
Erdogan government to vitalize relations by a second resolution, but this attempt was 
turned down by the Bush administration.165 
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In this context, in the face of recent PKK terrorist attacks on Turkish civilians and 
soldiers in the southern borders of Turkey, there was discontent that the United States did 
not stop the PKK from deploying from northern Iraq. Another sentiment among the 
Turkish public claims that the United States shows reluctance to put an end to the PKK’s 
existence in northern Iraq, and this is seen as an indicator that the United States is using 
the PKK for creating domestic unrest within Iran in preparation for a future military 
intervention on Iran. Although such a claim is denied by both governments and is seen as 
far from reality, U.S. unwillingness to seek support from Turkey in such an intervention 
or rejection of Turkey’s intermediary role between Iran and the United States is perceived 
as confirmation to that claim. 
D. TURKEY’S CONCERNS ABOUT ISRAELI RELATIONS 
Turkey’s threat perceptions rising from PKK and Syria’s alleged support, along 
with Israeli concerns rising from Islamic fundamentalism, increased the military 
partnership and collaboration on security issues between the two countries. Despite the 
fact that such close support was far from being called a strategic military alliance, the 
close cooperation on economic, political, and military issues created a combined effort 
showing their cautious security stance in the Middle East.166 This accorded stance became 
effective in breaking close Greece-Syria ties in the late 1990s. 
In the aftermath of the 2003 Iraqi War, however, political relations between 
Turkey and Israel changed considerably. While Turkey sees the emergence of an 
independent Kurdish state as an imminent threat to the stabilization of the Middle East 
and its domestic structure, Israel is seen to be enjoying the idea. Such an idea, though 
speculative, would be enjoyable to Israel because a military cooperation to build a 
forward defense line — especially against a nuclear-Iran with a newborn Kurdish state in 
northern Iraq — would generate a new strategic ally. A Kurdish state established with 
support of Israel would be dependent on Israel for its vital needs. Such dependency 
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would provide Israel considerable advantage to manipulate the newly emerged  
Kurdish state for its crucial stance in the region.167 
It is not known for sure how these speculative perceptions affect weakened 
relations, but Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan censured Israeli policies toward the 
Palestinians and condemned Israel with “state terrorism,” referring to the assassination of 
Hamas leaders.168 Harsh response came from an Israel official after Hamas visited 
Turkey, asking, “How would you feel if we got together with Abdullah Ocalan?” The 
JDP’s sensitivity to the Palestine problem might be seen as consistent with the party’s 
political view; however, their military’s attendance at Israel’s 56th anniversary with only 
a low-ranking general — in contrast to previous celebrations — is a clear indication of 
tense relations, especially resulting from Israel turning a blind eye, if not supporting PKK 
terrorism in northern Iraq.169 
The “Kurdish Jews” or (Jewish Kurds) are believed to be an important factor as to 
why Israeli officials are relatively disregardful of Turkish security concerns in northern 
Iraq.170 Those Kurdish citizens who emigrated from Iraq to Israel long before might 
explain the current Israeli attitude against Turkey, because their investments in Iraq might 
require such a supportive attitude to the region; however, as Kibaroglu argues, the main 
reason is claimed to be the deterioration of Turkey-U.S. relations.171 Turkish denial of 
U.S. troops basing on its soil caused significant changes to Washington’s war planning 
on Iran and this also changed Israeli perceptions. 
In any case, it is acknowledged that there is a divergence on Israeli and Turkish 
policies toward security concerns of the Middle East of the near future, and a Kurdish 
ally, in contrast to Turkey, might be enjoyable to Israel and the United States. Though 
speculative, it would be more practical for Iraqi Kurds and to reach a mutual consensus in 
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the region with Israel than with Turkey. Emergence of an autonomous Kurdish state 
would support Israel to establish forward defense line against a nuclear Iran, and this 
advantage would reduce Israeli military deficiencies and allow Israel to conduct 
independent military operations when needed for its vital interests. Turkey, being 
affected adversely from shifted Israeli security policies, would consider closing its 
political distance with Iran and Syria provided that Turkey lost its faith in the West and 
its long-standing ally—the United States. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Economical, political, and military impacts of the two Gulf Wars had profound 
side effects on the Turkish political elite, and this makes Turkey think twice before acting 
and supporting unilateral U.S. actions or coalitions with Israel, especially when they 
involve hot conflicts with Turkey’s neighbors. The same reasoning applies to the Turkish 
policy approach assessing a military intervention on Iran. A Turkish decision on a 
military strike will be affected by Turkish security perceptions in the region. The Middle 
East is a highly destabilized region where state perceptions can change in short periods of 
time. 
Turkey’s case after the first Gulf War indicates that Turkey’s increased 
importance brought both opportunities and constraints. Turkey’s foreign policies gained 
momentum and broke its status quo after the 1990–1991 Gulf War. Turkey’s value to 
Europe and NATO reached higher levels, and at the same time this was the first challenge 
for Turkish multilateral commitments, because a Kurdish refugee problem, along with its 
implications, also supplied Turkey a window of opportunity to employ policies out of the 
country. However, inconsistent and restless policies concerning northern Iraq, absent 
from sustainable economic power projections, made Turkey lose this opportunity. Still, 
the Turkish Armed Forces has adapted itself to irregular warfare against terrorism with 
relative success; northern Iraq has become a playground for the PKK with the support of 
neighboring countries. Turkey’s economic problems were behind its inconsistent policies, 
and this did not help Turkey in its rivalry with Iran in Central Asia. 
 62
The next challenge was to the NATO alliance in the 2003 Iraq War. The 
controversy of the American war on terrorism raised suspicions about its legitimacy, and 
the solidarity of NATO was fundamentally diminished. Though this does not mean an 
antitrust in NATO, Turkey feels less secure, since the commitment of Europe has openly 
showed itself in the Iraq War. Turkey’s decision not to become involved in the war is still 
debated, yet the diminished strategic level of U.S.-Turkey relations is far from any 
debate. Turkish-Israeli divergence is another problematic aspect resulting from the war, 
and Iraqi Kurds are closer to an autonomous Kurdish state than ever. In light of these two 
major events, it is simple to predict that waging, participating, supporting, or countering a 
war for a nuclear rollback on Iran’s program would be a more demanding task. The real 
question then is the readiness of Turkey. Turkey, rather than standing aside and waiting 
to see what happens next, must have something to say and must act in advance according 
















A nuclear Iran, with its important strategic position in the Middle East and its 
threat against Israel, would pose a great danger to peace and stability in the Middle East. 
The capability of mass destruction would provide Iran with incentives to alter the delicate 
balance of power, and this situation is not acceptable for Turkey’s security. Still, Turkey 
was exposed to proliferation developments on its borders and nuclear weapons deployed 
on its territory in the Cold War because of having borders with potential nuclear states 
such as Syria and Iraq. Although not a nuclear state and not likely to become one in the 
near future, Turkey is highly aware of the instability of the Middle East. 
The absence of conflicts with Iran since the seventeenth century has been 
maintained by a delicate balance of power based on mutual economic, political, and 
military parity between the two states. But, if Iran develops nuclear weapons and adopts 
more assertive policies against Turkey, that delicate balance will cease and give Iran 
more incentives to use its nuclear deterrence as political leverage in its relationship with 
Turkey. This thesis identifies the key issues that shape the Turkish relationship with Iran 
and assesses the potential political, economic, and military threats that will emerge from 
Iran’s nuclear quest. 
The different adaptations of Islam and political struggle became the main reason 
for hostility and rivalry for regional hegemony between the Ottomans and Persia until 
they reached a subtle and durable agreement in 1639. After World War I both Turkey 
under the leadership of Ataturk and Iran under Reza Shah followed almost the same 
revolutionary pattern. But Shah’s bid for promotion of Western values in Iran never 
reached the same level as the revolutionary and secular character of Ataturk’s ideas. The 
Cold War era and Soviet expansionism caused the stable relations to become 
consolidated. Both countries feared Soviet incursion and its expansionist external policies 
and thus adopted cooperative strategies and strengthened their ties with the West, 
especially with the United States. 
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On the other hand, post-revolutionary Iran was not the same Iran that Turkey 
recognized and adjusted to in the height of Cold War threats. Islamic traditionalism was 
in formidable practice in Iran with Ayatollah R. Khomeini. The Khomeini regime showed 
its explicit intention to promote the values of post-revolutionary Iran, and this promotion 
extended beyond Iran’s borders. Turkish claims about Islamic fundamentalism being 
supported by Iran, and Turkey’s discontent about the PKK, influence competition in 
Central Asia and Caucasus, and form a great possibility for a hot conflict if Iranian 
officials consider weapons of mass destruction as a credible deterrent against Turkey. 
Iran’s revolutionary ideologies were deeply affected from contemporary practical 
affairs and external political and economic situations in the international arena, causing 
inconsistency in Iran’s international behavior and restricting the success of revolutionary 
influence on other Muslim communities. However, a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran 
might feel confident about its own national security and focus its undivided attention on 
exporting its Islamic revolution. 
Continuous PKK attacks on Turkish soil, and Turkish military operations that 
extended beyond its borders in pursuit of remnant PKK guerillas, became a tense issue 
for Iran. Although both Turkey and Iran are concerned about the potential Iraqi territorial 
disintegration that would result with a Kurdish state in the North, the PKK-related crisis 
shows that the two countries are in fact very close to the hot conflicts. In any escalated 
scenario, Tehran might view nuclear weapons as leverage or compensation for its 
conventional disabilities. If Turkey coerces Tehran with limited use of force or harsh 
sanctions, as it did in 1995 and 1999, Iran might feel the need to use its WMD 
capabilities to preempt or prevent a Turkish incursion into northern Iraq or might threaten 
Ankara covertly or exclusively to strike strategic targets within Turkey. 
A nuclear Iran, relying on its WMD and advanced missiles capabilities, might 
pursue an aggressive stance in its policies toward its neighbors in Central Asia or in the 
Caucasus. Seeing itself as a nuclear power, Iran might feel more confident and exercise 
more assertive policies against Turkey. It is certain that a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran 
would gain more political bargaining power over Turkey on energy and economic issues 
of Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
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Turkey has adopted a soft diplomacy approach against Iran’s nuclear program. 
But this ambiguous diplomacy against nuclear weapons does not provide a clear 
definition of Turkey’s policies and actions to deter the development of weapons of mass 
destruction by Iran in the region. Israel is the main hard-liner in Iran’s nuclear debate. 
The United States, as an ally and close supporter of Israel, shares the same perception and 
poses a determined stance for an immediate solution. The European Union is more 
cautious and prefers diplomacy first; however, diplomacy and its most coercive method 
of sanctions for a rollback also yield its limitations, since the European nations have 
considerable trade with Iran. Internally, Turkey might choose to start its own nuclear 
weapons program or increase its own conventional defense capabilities to counterbalance 
Iran. 
Close ties with the United States, and Israel’s active participation in Turkey’s 
defense modernization, might lead to Turkey’s facilitating American and Israeli 
intervention in Iran; however, Turkey officially declared that it will not support a military 
operation that would result in hot conflicts adjacent to its borders. 
The European Union can be argued to have a great influence on Iran’s behavior in 
regards to its nuclear program; however, sustained international cooperation and support 
for sanctions against Iran is highly challenging.  France, Germany, Italy, and the U.K will 
probably face difficult choices in adopting economic sanctions on Iran, because their 
current economic relations with Iran are so important for their own prosperities. 
Turkey’s wariness about NATO’s reliability, especially regarding Article V 
contingencies, would propel Turkey to think about its internal counterbalancing options, 
especially if Europe maintained its demanding and unyielding attitude in accepting 
Turkey’s participation in the EU and did not commit itself to defending its would-be 
member Turkey’s vital security concerns in the near future in the Middle East. 
A nuclear-capable-Turkey is unlikely, given the openness of Turkey’s nuclear 
research program, small uranium reserves, lack of enrichment and reprocessing 
capabilities, and especially international pressure. In this regard, it is difficult to believe 
that Ankara could develop a weapons program in the near future, as long as Turkish 
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leaders keep their rationality in governing the country. Additionally, Turkey’s security 
perceptions, the country’s strong commitment to nonproliferation, and the challenging 
road to nuclear weapons will inevitably force Turkey to undertake serious precautions to 
improve its conventional capabilities to deter a nuclear Iran. 
Being a close neighbor to the Middle East, Turkey must define its political 
approach to Iran, reconsider its balance of options, if necessary, and be ready for the 
harsh consequences of a possible intervention against Iran, remembering the last two 
Gulf Wars and their deteriorating effects on Turkey’s security and economy. 
Turkey’s current policy approach to Iran, which is believed to be proceeding to a 
nuclear weapon level, is not defined yet and does not have yellow or red lines dissuading 
Iran. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s statement that “the continuation of Iran's nuclear 
program for peaceful ends is a natural right, but it is impossible to support it if it concerns 
the development of weapons of mass destruction” does not give any indication of how 
Turkey will act against the situation. Additionally, then president Abdullah Gul’s 
statements about not permitting or giving support to any kind of military prevention 
within Turkey’s borders discourage the United States and Israel for facilitation, but do 
not explain how Turkey’s behavior would be in consideration of sanctions.  
If ambiguity is a determined state policy, then Turkey’s current stance has nothing 
more to do in persuading Iran not to proceed to the next level; however, if ambiguity is a 
source of not knowing what to do, then more troubled and bloodier days could be on the 
borders of Turkey in near future. Thus, Turkey must choose its stance and take necessary 
precautions for different scenarios. Trying to become a friend to everyone is a strategy 
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